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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ADA BRIDGE and 
JOSEPH L. BRIDGE, 
husband and wife, 
P lainti If s and Appellants, 
-vs.-
LeGRAND P. BACKMAN, 
MILTON V. BACKMAN and 
HARLAN W. CLARK, d.b.a. 
BACKMAN, BACKMAN & CLARK, 
Defend·ants and Respondents. 
BRIEF ,OF APPELLANTS 
Case No. 9197 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The plaintiffs and appellants will be referred to as 
appellants or in their own names, and defendants and 
respondents will be referred to collectively as respondents 
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or individually in their own names; contestant Theo Hendee 
will be referred to as contestant or by her own name; 
decedent, Wilda Gail Swan will be referred to as testatrix 
or in her own name. 
All italics are ours. 
The following appendices appear at the back of this 
Brief for the convenience of the court: 
APPENDIX NO. 1. 
Complaint and Contest. 
APPENDIX NO. 2. 
Memorandum Decision. 
APPENDIX NO. 3. 
Pages 8 to 17 inclusive of the court's Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of law. 
APPENDIX NO. 4. 
Objections to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
APPENDIX NO. 5. 
Notice of Appeal. 
APPENDIX NO. 6. 
Last Will and Testament of Wilda Gail Swan. 
APPENDIX NO. 7. 
Codicil to Last Will and Testament of Wilda Gail Swan. 
APPENDIX NO. 8. 
Second Codicil to Last Will and Testament of Wilda Gail 
Swan. 
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APPENDIX NO. 9. 
Exhibit "D-18". An exact duplicate of defendant's 
Exhibit 18, which is a graphic portrayal of the properties 
and devises involved in the will contest. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an action by plaintiffs and appellants, Ada 
Bridge and Joseph L. Bridge, husband and wife, against 
LeGrand P. Backman, Milton V. Backman and Harlan W. 
Clark, doing business as Backman, Backman & Clark, de-
fendants and respondents, Civil Action No. 120538, filed 
in the Salt Lake County District Court, State of Utah, on 
the 14th day of April, 1959, for damages arising out of 
respondent's negligence in failing to appeal appellant's 
cause of action in that certain matter entitled, "In the 
Matter of the Estate of Wilda Gail Swan, Deceased-Theo. 
Swan Hendee, plaintiff vs. Walker Bank and Trust Co., 
Executor of the Last Will and Testament of Wilda Gail 
Swan, Deceased; Grant Macfarlane; Daniel Kostopulos; 
and Ada Bridge, defendants, Probate No. 34571 and Civil 
No. 96,977, in the District Court of Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. 
Wilda Gail Swan died on the 28th day of May, 1952 
at Salt Lake City, Utah leaving a Will, executed on the 2nd 
day of May, 1947, (Appendix No. 6), a Codicil, executed 
on the 20th day of February, 1950 (Appendix No. 7), a 
second Codicil executed on the 23rd way of April, 1951 
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(Appendix No. 8), a graphic portrayal of the properties 
devised which is shown in (Appendix No.9, Exhibit "D-18.") 
On the 5th day of June, 1952, the Walker Bank and 
Trust Company filed in the Third Judicial District Court, 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, probate division, 
a petition for the probate of said Will and Codicils, and for 
issuance of letters testamentary. 
On the 25th day of June, 1952 Patricia P. Stewart 
testified as subscribing witness to the Will and first Codicil, 
and Adolph M. Neilsen, M.D. testified as subscribing witness 
to the second Codicil. On the same date, Judge Martin M. 
Larson signed an order admitting Will and Codicils to 
probate and letters testamentary were issued to th~ Walker 
Bank and Trust Company as Executor of the Estate of 
Wilda Gail Swan, deceased. 
Thereafter on the 8th day of November, 1952, Theo 
Swan Hendee filed civil action No. 96,977 alleging generally 
that at the time of executing the Will and Codicils, Wilda 
Gail Swan lacked testamentary capacity and was acting 
under the undue influence of Grant Macfarlane and of 
Daniel Kostopulos, a friend and beneficiary named in the 
Codicils and alleged therein that Ada Bridge, one of the 
plaintiffs herein and appellant was named as a devisee and 
praying that the Will and Codicils be declared null and void 
and that the entire estate be distributed to Theo Swan 
Hendee, as the only heir of the deceased. 
Bell Martsolf, one of the devisees in the second Codicil 
was not made a party to the action. 
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All of the defendants therein filed their answers. The 
defendants and respondents filed the answer of Ada Bridge. 
The said complaint failed to state a cause of action against 
Ada Bridge. 
The case was tried before the Honorable Parley E. 
Norseth, sitting without a jury. At the conclusion of the 
protestant's case, LeGrand P. Backman moved for non-suit 
on the grounds that there was no evidence of undue influ-
ence exercised by Ada Bridge upon the decedent (R. 669, 
670), which motion was denied by the court. 
On the 14th day of May, 1954, the Court made its 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and entered judgment 
in favor of the protestant and revoked probate of the Will 
and Codicils. On the 25th day of May, 1954 Ada Bridge 
filed objections to the trial court's findings, conclusions 
of law and proposed judgment. (Appendix No. 4) 
On the 24th day of May, 1954, Macfarlane and Kosto-
pulos filed their motion for a new trial. Defendants and 
respondents did not file a motion for a new trial or any other 
motion which would extend the time for filing a notice of 
appeal. Said motion for a new trial by Macfarlane and 
Kostopulos was denied by the court on the 15th day of 
July, 1954 and on the same day Macfarlane and Kostopulos 
filed their notice of appeal. 
On the 6th day of August, 1954 defendants and respond-
ents filed a notice of appeal on behalf of Ada Bridge 
(Appendix No. 5), but failed to file a bond on appeal, 
designation of the record on appeal or file briefs therein, as 
it is alleged in plaintiff's and appellant's complaint that they 
agreed to do. On motion of protestant's attorneys, Ada 
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Bridge's appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court for 
failure to file said notice of appeal on time, to post bond on 
appeal and for failure to designate the record on appeal, on 
the 18th day of October, 1954. 
On the 15th day of February, 1956, the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah, reversed the trial court, except for the 
bequests made to Grant Macfarlane and Daniel Kostopulos, 
which were held to be given them by Gail by reason of undue 
influence. The Supreme Court did not hold that the Will 
and Codicils were null and void. Plaintiffs and appellants 
filed their complaint asking damages against defendants 
and respondents for the reasonable market value of the 
property devised to Ada Bridge in decedent's second codicil, 
on the 14th day of April, 1959, alleging negligence of the 
defendants and respondents and that had defendants and 
respondents appealed plaintiff's case, as they agreed to do, 
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah would have reversed 
the trial court and found the second codicil valid in so far as 
the Bridge bequest was concerned. 
On motion of defendants and respondents herein, Judge 
Ray VanCott entered summary judgment against the plain· 
tiffs and appellants on the 18th day of December, 1959. 
A BRIEF HISTORY 
In as much as this action is based upon what the 
Supreme Court would have done upon appeal had defendants 
and respondents properly apealed Ada Bridge's case the 
ultimate decision of this appeal will require a statement of 
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the evidence in the Hendee case to determine whether or not 
there was any evidence sufficient to support the findings of 
the trial court in that matter of undue influence exerted by 
Ada Bridge or her husband Joseph L. Bridge upon Wilda 
Gail Swan. 
Wilda Gail Swan was born at Salt Lake City, Utah in 
1890 (R. 94). Her sister and only heir-in-law, Theo Swan 
Hendee, was born in 1888 ( R. 94). Gail's father was Ed 
Swan (R. 93). Her mother was Blanche Swan (R. 93). Gail 
was a normal child until she was about twelve when she 
suffered a violent epileptic seizure ( R. 95). These seizures 
continued until about 1917 when a Dr. McGee, at Laramie, 
Wyoming, began treating her and her condition became much 
improved (R. 100). During those years from 1902 to 1917 
when Gail suffered these seizures, she did not attend school, 
but was privately tutored by a Mrs. Sneddon (R. 140). Gail 
never married, and due to her physical frailties, lived a 
secluded life (R. 101, 108, 131), until she became acquaint-
ed with the Bridges in 1944 (R. 604) and they, Gail, Mrs. 
Bridge, Mr. Bridge and Oscar Beam\ began playing cards, 
canasta ( R. 605) , and later she joined a club consisting of 
herself, Ada Bridge, Ada's mother Mrs. Leavitt, Ada's sisters 
Wand a Bollschweiler, Dorothy Sheets and Geraldine Hatch 
(R. 764). 
Gail and her parents moved to the family residence at 
1335 Perry Ave. in 1922 (R. 104), where her mother died 
in 1931 (R. 107). From this time Gail's physical condition 
improved (R. 112). Gail's father died on the 30th of June, 
1950 ( R. 119). She continued to live at the family home 
until her own death on the 28th day of May, 1952. Three 
different housekeepers stayed with her after her father's 
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death and until she died, the first being Mrs. Sheeran, the 
second Grace Folden, and the last Alice Wagstaff (R. 119). 
During the last six years of her life, Gail was hospital· 
ized five times, the last being approximately six weeks at the 
L.D.S. Hospital. She was treated on this occasion by 
Dr. Frank. \ 
Gail's only living relatives at the time of her death were 
her sister, Theo, her aunt, Bell Martsolf, a cousin, Dee Stone, 
who practiced law in New York City, and a cousin, Mrs. 
Bowell, who lived at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania (R. 129). 
Gail and Theo 
Theo lived at the Swan home until she graduated from 
high school. In 1907, 1908 and 1909 she attended the 
University of California. In 1909, 1910 and 1911 she 
attended Vassar, an exclusive school for women, and gradu· 
ated with an A.B. degree in 1911 (R. 98). Then she at-
tended the University of Utah where she received a B.S. 
degree (R. 141). 
From 1911 to 1913 she taught school at Mountain 
Home, Idaho. In 1913 and 1914 she toured Europe with 
Mrs. Bogue and her daughter (R. 98, 99). 
Theo married Harold (Deek) Hendee in 1914 and 
lived with him in the East until 1922, when they moved to 
San Francisco, California, where Mr. Hendee worked for the 
Oakland Tribune, the Coast Banner and thereafter became 
editor of the Wall Street Journal ( R. 104) . During the 
years that followed, Theo visited the Swan household two 
or three times a year (R. 110-112). She corresponded with 
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Gail and frequently called her by telephone (R. 112). 
Theo belonged to exclusive clubs in San Francisco (R. 142, 
143). 
Theo testified that as a result of the extreme difference 
in their social positions Gail had an inferiority complex in 
her relationship with her (R. 141). 
Following the year 1935 Gail visited at Theo's home on 
two occasions. She didn't feel at home at Theo's (R. 145). 
Aunt Bell Martsolf testified to Gail's awareness of the dif-
ference in the social life between Gail and Theo ( R. 293). 
Gail had certain difficulties with Theo from time to 
time, and on more than one occasion had responded to Theo's 
questions with the answer, "None of your business" (R, 131, 
13~ 167, 478, 128). 
Theo had considerable property of her own ( 163, 165, 
166). 
Gail and the Bridges 
In 1944 Joseph Lamar Bridge was in the army, and 
Ada, his wife, was helping with family finances by selling 
eggs and butter. She first became acquainted with Mr. Swan 
and Gail as customers. As time passed, she and Gail became 
very well acquainted (R. 604). When Mr. Bridge returned 
in December, 1945 he became acquainted with Gail ( R. 604) . 
Thereafter they visited back and forth two or three times 
a week until the death of Gail, playing canasta (R. 605, 
626). 
The friendship with Ada Bridge was a beautiful thing 
in the life of Gail and Theo recognized this ( R. 184), and 
testified as follows: 
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Q. Surely. 
A. I would say that in '48 when I came that 
Dan objected to a business-
Q. What did he say? 
A. He said, "You must cut the Bridges, be-
cause Gail is giving them so much money." He 
said it over and over and over and over. "Gail will 
give all her property away. If I can get her to give 
the property to me I will give it back to you," and I 
believed Dan - -
Q. What did Mr. Kastopulos say to you, with 
reference to Dr. Frank and the Bridges? 
A. He took me down to Dr. Frank's office. 
All the way down he kept telling me that I must 
absolutely cut off the Bridges, and that I must turn 
the case of Gail, while I was gone, over to him. I 
said nothing. He talked all the way down. We 
went into Dr. Frank's office, and Dan went with me, 
and I said, "Dr. Frank, you are the physician. I have 
to go to Europe. Gail is out of danger and I will 
turn the case over to you, because I feel you are 
reliable. Dan wishes me to cut off the Bridges. 
They have brought and do bring Gail too much 
pleasure." 
Dr. Frank said that the visiting of the Bridges with Gail 
would be good for Gail (R. 626, 627). 
Mrs. Martsolf testified that the relationship between 
Gail and the Bridges was "very intimate" (R. 277); 
that Mr. Swan also was very fond of the Bridges (R. 314, 
317); that Gail preferred the Bridges to the family (R. 277). 
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Gail claimed to be part of the Bridge family ( R. 609) 
and insisted on naming two of the Bridge children ( R. 607, 
624, 626, 627) and said that they were about the only 
family that she would ever have (R. 772). 
Mrs. Folden testified that the relationship between 
Gail and Mr. and Mrs. Bridge was, "very affectionate" 
(R. 412). 
Gail gave the Bridges many gifts during her lifetime; 
a ring for her birthday, which had been given to Gail by her 
mother, hose for Christmas and her birthday (R. 620, 621); 
$100.00 with which to buy tires (R. 631, 632); She wanted 
to give Bridges $:3,000.00 to complete their home, but the 
Bridges refused to accept said sum as a gift, but did agree 
to accept it as a loan, and made payments thereon of cash and 
by work rendered for Gail. Gail made a gift of the balance 
to the Bridges ( R. 644, 645). 
Ada Bridge recognized that Gail had a need for a 
family tie and out of a Christian heart gave her love and 
affection ( R. 628) . 
Grant Macfarlane, Dan Kostopulos and the Bridges 
Macfarlane became acquainted with Kostopulos when 
Mr. Swan was taken to the Holy Cross Hospital during his 
last illness in June of 1950 (R. 757). The next time Mac-
farlane saw Kostopulos was shortly after Macfarlane's sec-
ond eye operation when Kostopulos took Gail to Macfarlane's 
home and the two of them took him for a short walk (R. 757). 
Thereafter Macfarlane saw Kostopulos only a few times 
(R. 758). 
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Macfarlane met the Bridges at the Swan home when 
they were playing Canasta one evening with Gail. He had 
only seen them on two or three occasions prior to Gail's 
death (R. 758). 
Kostopulos apparently had no association with the 
Bridges, although he was acquainted with them. Theo testi-
fieJ that Kostopulos actually was OPPOSED TO THE 
CLOSE FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN GAIL AND THE 
BRIDGES (R. 183, 184). 
Grant Macfarlane, when he drew the second Codicil, 
the one in which Ada Bridge was given the bequest, took 
from himself two valuable pieces of real property and gave 
to others (Appendixes 7, 8). He would not use undue 
influence upon Gail to do this, and certainly Kostopulos 
would not use undue influence upon Gail in behalf of the 
Bridges (R. 183, 184). 
Gail not easily persuaded or influenced 
Bell Martsolf testified: (R. 302, 303) 
Q. Did you tell her to cut it out? 
A. I tried to. You couldn't tell her very 
much; she wouldn't hear it. 
Q. She was rather strong-minded, wasn't she? 
A. Yes. 
Q. She knew what she wanted? 
A. She thought she did. 
Q. You thought she did too, didn't you? 
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A. I don't know; sometimes we want things 
that are not good for us. 
Q. Her mind wasn't weak to the extent that 
you could easily talk her out of doing the things she 
wanted to do, was it? 
A. No, she made up her mind; she had very 
little judgment as to the proper things to do. 
Q. When she made up her mind, no one could 
talk her out of it, could they? 
A. Not easily. 
Gail's Properties and Her Business Activities 
Gail did not want Theo to know her business' (R. 131, 
132, 167). 
During the years following her mother's death, Gail's 
father managed the properties ( R. 113, 114) . However, 
he was anxious to lay down these responsibilities. 
In the year of 1940 he turned over many of his responsi-
bilities to Gail and Judge Armstrong. Judge Armstrong 
assisted Gail and according to Theo, "taught her a great 
deal" about managing the business (R. 114, 156). Gail 
managed her own properties, with the aid of her father 
until about the year 1949 when Gail turned her properties 
over to Tracy-Collins Trust Company (R. 121, 122, 774, 
775). Then on the 1st of April the management of the 
properties was taken from Tracy-Collins Trust Company 
by Gail and given to the Walker Bank & Trust Company 
(R. 779). 
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Medical Testimony as to Gail's Mental and 
Physical Condition 
Dr. Edward LeCompte, an M.D., who had practiced as 
an eye, ear, nose and throat specialist from 1915 until his 
retirement in 1948, called as a witness by contestant Theo, 
testified that he met Gail Swan as a patient in the mid 20's 
and attended her from time to time until a few days before his 
retirement ( R. 385, 388) . He gave an opinion that Gail's 
mental development was, "about eleven or twelve years, I 
should think." He stated that the average person is con· 
sidered to have a mental development of 15 years, so that 
Gail would, in his opinion, have a mentality which was about 
"four-fifths of normal" and further, that epilepsy does not 
necesarily result in mental deficiency or mental deterioration 
and that many persons with superior mentality are epilep· 
tics ( R. 390, 392) . He further testified that on occasions 
Gail would discuss various subjects, among which was the 
difficulty she was experiencing in collecting rents on her 
properties and that he understood what she was talking 
about ( R. 394, 395) . 
Dr. William D. Pace, an M.D., specializing in psychi-
atry, and a member of the American Board of Neurology 
and Psychiatry ( R. 822) , called by the proponents, testified 
that Gail was his father's patient from October, 1948 until 
his father's death in July of 1950. During this time he saw 
her on a number of occasions and on two occasions examined 
her while his 'father was away on trips (R. 822). She was 
being given anti-convulsion drugs, principally mesantoin 
and phenobarbital for epilepsy ( R. 823). 
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Following his father's death Gail came to his office 
on two occasions in August and September of 1950. In the 
Winter of 1950 he was called to see her at the L.D.S. Hos-
pital while she was under treatment by Dr. Cowan for cancer. 
Dr. Cowan requested Dr. Pace to take care of the anti-con-
vulsion control (R. 823). He testified that the various anti-
convulsion control drugs would have no adverse effect when 
taken over a period of time; that phenobarbital is a sedative 
and would make the average person drowsy and sleepy, but 
when taken over a period of time a person would become 
used to it and it would no longer have that effect (R. 82·3, 
824). He testified that Gail was of a low average intelli-
gence, but that she was not feeble-minded; that she was able 
to carry on a coherent conversation and that there was nothing 
about her that would indicate she was irrational in any way. 
He saw no evidence of insanity ( R. 824, 825). He placed 
her mental development in a range of II to 13 years 
(R. 826). 
Joseph Emory Frank, a physician and surgeon, called 
by Theo, testified that he was called upon to treat Gail 
on October 9, 1950. On this occasion his diagnosis was that 
there was a mild obstruction from adhesion or a carcinoma 
(R. 446). He kept her on mesantoin and phenobarbital 
to control her epilepsy. These tablets were taken morning 
and night (R. 449). The doses were varied from time to 
time. Her epilepsy was of the petit mal type in which the 
seizures are less in severity and duration than the grand mal 
type. The drugs kept the seizures under satisfactory control 
(R. 466, 527, 529). She gave him a previous history of 
only one attack in six months ( R. 445, 448). He made 60 
professional calls on Gail in the year 1951 and 1952 (R. 454, 
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455). Dr. Frank's opiniOn was that her mental age was 
12 to 15 years (R. 465). He testified that her physical in-
firmities and afflictions would not effect her in any way 
mentally. 
Adolph M. Neilsen, physician and surgeon, and spe-
cialist in surgery, called on behalf of proponents, testified 
that he received a call from Macfarlane concerning Gail in 
April, 1951 (R. 837). Macfarlane told him he had a client 
who was making some changes in a will and who had ex-
pressed a desire to have an examination and asked if Dr. 
Neilsen would perform this service, and he performed 
a physical examination of Gail Swan at his office on April 
23, 1951. His office girl was the only other person present. 
The examination revealed that Gail was in a good state of 
health (R. 838, 839). While Dr. Nielsen was examining 
Gail his office girl called Dr. Roy A. Darke, who officed in 
the same building. Dr. Neilsen had made tentative arrange-
ments for Dr. Darke to make a mental examination of Gail 
several days earlier (R. 804). Dr. Darke arrived and made 
a mental examination in Dr. Neilsen's presence, using ques-
tionnaires and tables for this purpose (R. 839, 842). 
Execution of Second Codicil 
At 5:15p.m., on April 23, 1951, as a result of previous 
arrangements, Dr. Darke went to Dr. Neilsen's office. Dr. 
Neilsen, Gail, Macfarlane and Kostopulos were present. 
Before examination, Macfarlane read the Codicil aloud and 
some questions were asked Gail pertaining particularly to the 
property involved. During the examination, Macfarlane and 
Kostopulos left the office. He testified that his examination 
consisted of a series of questions to rule out insanity and to 
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evaluate Gail's mental status with respect to her history of 
epilepsy and to determine whether she had the mental 
ability to understand her property and plan its distribution. 
The examination took approximately an hour. Dr. Darke 
further stated that Gail was very familiar with her proper-
ties; had a definite and intelligent plan for their distribution 
in her will and codicils. He testified: "I felt that SHE 
DID WISH TO DO WHAT SHE WAS SAYING SHE 
WANTED TO DO WITH HER PROPERTY. That that was 
her wish. She was very calm, and there wasn't ANXIETY 
OR TENSION as we talked to her. We talked to her pri-
vately. WE DISCUSSED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER 
SHE WAS UNDER PRESSURE OR FORCE, OR WHETH-
ER SHE FELT THAT ANYONE WAS TRYING TO HAVE 
HER DO THIS. SHE SAID NOT. THAT THIS WAS 
WHAT SHE WISHED TO DO." (R. 806, 807). 
Dr. Darke also made a mental examination to determine 
Gail's intellectual ability. The tests indicated that she had 
the intellectual ability of an average 12 year old person, 
while the average mental age at the adult level is about 
16 (R. 804, 807). Concerning Gail's emotional stability, 
he testified: "Well, in relation to her emotional maturity, 
there would be some restriction, you might say, by the 
mental age. She, however, was very, very businesslike. She 
listed her properties and discussed them, and discussed 
rentals and discussed these various people that she wished 
to leave money to, discussed people that she was associated 
with, in-well, in a fashion that would indicate that she 
was functioning at the level of her age, I would say." 
(R. 812, 813). 
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The Bridges were not present, hut Macfarlane and 
Kostopulos were, and sat in the reception room and Dr. 
Nielson took Gail into his inner office (R. 731). In about . 
thirty minutes Dr. Darke entered Dr. Neilson's office and in 
about another thirty minutes Dr. Darke came out and asked 
Kostopulos and Macfarlane to come in the office where Gail 
was. Dr. Darke asked Gail a few questions and then Dr. 
Darke excused Macfarlane and Kostopulos. Dr. Darke then 
came out and said, "She is competent to sign this will thatyou 
have prepared." Macfarlane said to Gail, "Is this your co-
dicil?", and she answered "Yes". At that time the two 
doctors, Dan Kostopulos, Grant Macfarlane and Gail 
Swan were present. She signed and tht1 two doctors then 
affixed their signatures in each other's presence and in Gail's 
presence (R. 331, 731, 806, 814). Macfarlane never 
discussed the contents of the will or codicils with anyone 
(R. 205, 207, 210). The Court, in its findings of fact, 
found that the Bridges were not present when the wills and 
codicils were executed (Appendix No. 3, at No. 28). The 
bequest to Ada Bridge, in the second Codicil was the free 
and independent act of Gail Swan, wholely free from, or 
of any undue influence, or pressure of the Bridges, or of 
Macfarlane or Kostopulos on Ada Bridge's behalf. The 
undue influence of Macfarlane and Kostopulos did not taint 
all of the second Codicil. There is no evidence in the 
record contrary to this affirmation. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT 1. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RESPOND-
ENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND 
ENTRY THEREOF. 
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POINT II. 
THE SUPREME COURT WOULD HAVE REVERSED 
THE TRIAL COURT IN FAVOR OF ADA BRIDGE AND 
AGAINST PROTESTANT, THEO HENDEE HAD RE-
SPONDENTS PERFECTED ADA BRIDGE'S APPEAL, ON 




THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RESPOND-
ENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND 
ENTRY THEREOF. 
The grounds for respondent's motion for summary judg-
ment were, first, that the Supreme Court held in the matter 
of In re Wilda Gail Swan's Estate, 4 Utah 2d 277, 293 P. 
2d 682, the Will and Codicils of Gail Swan, deceased, 
were null and void because of the undue influence of Mac-
farlane and Kostopulos, but that decedent had testamentary 
capacity, and second, that appellant's cause of action is a 
collateral attack upon that decision. It seems incumbent 
upon appellant to argue these two grounds as well as the 
point that the Supreme Court would have reversed the judg-
ment of the trial court had respondents perfected the appeal 
of Ada Bridge upon the grounds alleged in appellant's 
amended complaint. 
Since the Supreme Court has already found that Gail 
Swan had testamentary capacity at the time or times when 
she executed her will and first and second codicils, in re 
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Wilda Gail Swan's Estate, supra, space will not be taken here-
in to argue that point. The only questions to be argued herein 
are whether an attorney is liable to his client for his negli-
gence in failing to appeal and whether the Supreme Court 
would have reversed the trial court's judgment against Ada 
Bridge had respondents perfected her appeal. 
Liability Of Attorney For Negligence 
In Failure To Perfect Appeal 
The negligence of an attorney in failing to take proper 
steps to protect his client's rights of appeal or review is held 
actionable, where, as a result, the right of appeal was lost. 
45 A L R 2d 52, Sec. 21 (a). 
Damages 
In the case of Louis Pete Jr. vs. Annie S. Henderson, 
California, 124 Cal. App. 2d 487,269 P. 2d 78, 45 A L R 2d 
58, the facts were: 
Plaintiff as administrator, retained Henderson to rep· 
resent him in an action in which he was defendant. Judg-
ment in that action was entered against appellant for 
$1,660.00. Appellant then employed Henderson to prose· 
cute an appeal from that judgment, and, pursuant to agree· 
ment, paid him $150.00 for that purpose. Henderson failed 
to file the notice of appeal until one day late .... appellant 
was forced to and did pay the judgment creditor $1,660.00, 
the amount of the judgment. Thereupon this action was in· 
stituted against Henderson, who was then living. Henderson 
died during the pendency of the action and respondent, as 
administratrix of his estate was substituted in his place. 
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The court said: 
"A lawyer is required to exercise due care in the 
handling of the affairs of his client and must perform 
his professional duties to the best of his ability. 
Clark v. St. Bar of California, 39 Cal 2d 161, 246 P 
2d 1. If he does not do so, he is liable to his client 
for such failure if damages results. His liability, 
as in other negligence cases, is for all damages 
directly! and proximately caused by his negligence. 
See cases collected 6 Cal. J ur 2d 324 Sec. 146)" 
Pleadings and Proof and Collateral Attack 
The court further said: 
"It is true that the plaintiff in such a case must 
plead and prove that the appeal, had it been taken, 
would have resulted in a reversal. 
"Such proof would not constitute a collateral at-
tack on the judgment. The judgment in the first 
action, as between the parties to that action is final. 
The purpose of the present action is not to reverse 
that judgment. It has been finally determined that 
the judgment creditor in the first action is entitled 
to that money. The appellant is not trying to gain 
recoupment from that judgment creditor. He is seek-
ing to recover damages from his attorney, who was 
not a party to the first action, for his negligence in 
permitting the judgment to become final without 
taking an appeal. If he can prove that the judgment 
in that case was erroneous and WOULD HAVE 
BEEN REVERSED, he should be permitted to do so. 
In that event he has proved damage proximately 
caused by the negligence. If this were not the rule, 
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attorneys would be PLACED IN A SPECIAL CLASS, 
IN THAT THEY, UNLIKE OTHER PERSONS, 
WOULD BE FREED FROM LIABILITY FOR CER-
TAIN DAMAGES DIRECTLY AND PROXIMATE-
LY CAUSED BY THEIR NEGLIGENCE. THERE 
IS NO REASON FOR PLACING THEM IN SUCH 
A SPECIAL CLASS. 
"The trial judge was of the opinion, and so 
ruled, that he had no power to rule on the propriety 
of another trial judge's judgment which had become 
final. It was his theory that such proof would con-
stitute a collateral attack on a final judgment and 
that this is not permitted by the law." 
POINT II. 
THE SUPREME COURT WOULD HAVE REVERSED 
THE TRIAL COURT IN FAVOR OF ADA BRIDGE AND 
AGAINST PROTESTANT, THEO HENDEE, HAD RE-
SPONDENTS PERFECTED ADA BRIDGE'S APPEAL, ON 
THE GROUNDS PLEADED IN APPELLANT'S AMEND-
ED COMPLAINT. 
Testamentary Capacity 
Appellants will not argue the question of testamentary 
capacity since the Supreme Court decided that Gail (Testa· 
trix) had testamentary capacity. In re Wilda Gail Swan's 
Estate, supra. 
Burden Of Proof and Presumptions 
The burden of proving undue influence by a prepon-
derance of the evidence rested upon contestant, Theo Hen-
dee. She failed to prove her case against Ada Bridge. 
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There is not one shred of evidence in the record to support 
the trial court's finding that there was a confidential 
relationship exsiting between decedent, Wilda Gail Swan, 
on the one hand and Ada Bridge and Joseph L. Bridge on the 
other (Appendix No. 3, Paragraph No. 28), or that the 
Bridges exercised undue influence upon testatrix. 
In re Hansen's Will, 50 Utah 207, 167 P 256, 259, 
the court said: 
"The burden of proving fraud or force in the 
procurement of a will (unlike the simple issue of 
testamentary capacity) liee, upon those who contest 
the instrument; and anything which imputed heinous 
misconduct to a party concerned and interested in its 
execution ought to be fairly established by a PRE-
PONDERANCE OF PROOF. AS TO UNDUE IN-
FLUENCE, IN THE USUAL AND LESS OFFEN-
SIVE SENSE, THE BURDEN OF PROVING AF-
FIRMATIVELY THAT IT OPERATED UPON THE 
WILL IN QUESTION LIES STILL ON THE PARTY 
WHO ALLEGES IT, EITHER BY DIRECT EVI-
DENCE OR PROOF OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN-
CONSISTENT WITH FAIR DEALING." 
In re Wilda Gail Swan's Estate, supra, the court said: 
"Ordinarily the burden of persuasion, as dis-
tinguished from the burden of making a prima facie 
case from which the fact finder could reasonably find 
the issue in his favor, is on the party whose claim 
for relief depends on the existence of such fact." 
For other supporting cases see: In re Bryan's Estate, 
82 Utah 390, 25 P 2d 602; In re Anderson's Estate, 235 
P 2d 869 (Syl. 10-12); In re Knutson's Will, 149 Or. 
467, 488, 41 P 2d 793; Am. Dig. Key No. 163 Note (1). 
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Wilda Gail Swan's will and codicils were admitted to 
probate before contest was filed by contestant. In re 
Bryan's Estate, supra, the court said: 
"It will be noted that the will had already been 
duly admitted to probate before contest was filed, 
so that the burden of proof rested on contestant to 
establish the grounds of the contest. 28 R.C.L. 398; 
In re Hanson's Will 50 Utah 207, 167 P. 256." 
Confidential Relationship-Friendship 
There is no evidence in the record to support the court's 
finding that there was a confidental relationship between 
Gail and the Bridges. There was no fiduciary relation be-
tween them. If it was the close friendship existing between 
them, of which all the witnesses testified, that could not 
support the court's finding. We will first discuss what a 
confidential relation is and whether it is a result of friend-
ship. 
In re Tate-Jones & Co., 85 Fed. Supp. 971, 981, the 
court said: 
"A 'confidental relation' exists between two 
persons whenever one has gained confidence of 
another and PURPORTS TO ACT OR ADVISE 
WITH THE OTHERS' INTEREST IN MIND, and 
it isn't limited to any particular association of parties, 
but ~xists whenever one occupies toward another such 
a position of ADVISER OR COUNSELOR AS TO 
REASONABLY INSPIRE CONFIDENCE that he 
will act in good faith for the other's interest." 
In re Brand, 173 N.Y.S. 169, 173, 185 App. Div. 
134 the court said: 
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"A confidential relation" IS NOT A 'FRIEND-
SHIP' as we may love one in whom we have no con-
fidence in a business way." 
In re Bould's Estate, California, 287 P 2d 8, the court 
"The fact that the plaintiff and defendant's 
agent were close friends and had had considerable 
business dealings with each other did not give rise 
to a 'confidential relation' between them and did not 
warrant intervention of a court in equity to set aside, 
on ground of fraud, a lease by plaintiff to defendant, 
and obtained from plaintiff by defendant's agent by 
alleged misrepresentation that the lease was only a 
waiver of rent for year for which plaintiff had re-
ceived the rent." 
For other cases in suport of the above see the following 
cases: Sewell V. Ladd, Mo. App. 158 S.W. 2d 752, 756, 
757; Carpenter V. Kingham 109 P 2d 463, 475; 56 Wyo. 
314; In re Gleespin's Will, 26 N.J. Equity 523; Mackall 
V. Mackall, 135 U.S. 167, 10 S. Ct. 705; Kelley V. Me· 
Carthy 57 P 2d 118; In re Andersen's Estate, supra, (9); 
Popejoy V. Eastburn, 41 N. W. 2d 764, 769; Szekeres V. 
Reed, 215 P 2d 522, 529, 96 Cal. App. 2d 348; Kahan V. 
Greenfield, 67 A. 2d 567, 568; 165 P. Super. 148; Barron 
vs. Reardon 137 Md. 308, 113 A, 283, 285; Stump vs. 
Stern C.C.A. W.Va. 254 F. 535, 538. 
Test of Undue Influence and Sufficiency 
Even if there were facts in evidence in the record suf-
ficient to establish a confidential relationship between Ada 
Bridge and Gail, existence of which we deny, but for purpose 
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of· argument, protestant had the burden to prove that! Ada 
Bridge used or exerted undue influence upon Gail at the 
very time the second codicil was executed by Gail or that 
someone else did on her behalf. The trial court found in 
its findings (Appendix No.3, Paragraph 28) that the Bridges 
were not present when the second codicil was executed nor 
did they participate in the preparation thereof. It failed to 
make findings of other facts to show that the minds of the 
Bridges were exerted upon Gail to the point where Gail 
could not exert her own mind and will in the making of the 
second codicil, or that it was not her own. 
In re Lavelle's Estate, 122 Utah 253, 248 P 2d 372, 
the court said: 
"Mere opportunity, interest, CONFIDENTIAL 
RELATION or WEAKENED PHYSICAL CON-
DITION of testatrix yield no presumption of undue 
influence, hut such factors or combination of them do 
provide fertile ground for exercise of such influence 
and therefore, where they exist, the court is. under a 
duty to scrutinize carefully THE FACTS AND 
CIRCUMSTANCES RELATING TO EXECUTION 
OF THE WILL." 
In re Bould's Estate, supra, the court said: 
"'However, the confidential relation alone is 
not sufficient. There must be acts on the part of the 
beneficiary in the matter of the PREPARATION OF 
THE WILL.' Some incidental activity in the EX-
ECUTION rather than the preparation of the will is 
not enough to swing the burden. "The Lingenfelter 
opinion, supra, 38 Cal 2d at page 586, 241 P 2d at 
page 999 says: ."However, participation in execu· 
tion of the· will can not be inferred from the fact that 
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Madge accompanied Vivian (the Testatrix) to Pow-
ell's office, in the absence of any indication that 
Vivian went there at Madge's instigation or request, 
or that Vivian WAS NOT ACTING ENTIRELY IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH HER OWN DESIRE." 
In support of the above see also In re Stauffer's Estate, 
California 297 P 2d 1029-1033 Syl. ( 3). 
In Anderson V s. Anderson 43 Utah 26, 134 P 553, 557 
the court said: 
"Undue influence, however used, must, in 
ORDER TO A VOID A WILL, destroy the free agency 
of the testator AT THE TIME AND IN THE VERY 
ACT OF THE MAKING OF THE TESTAMENT. 
IT MUST BEAR DIRECTLY UPON THE TESTA-
MENTARY ACT. The Supreme Court of Kansas 
in a very recent case (Ginter V. Ginter, 79 Kan. 721, 
101 P 634, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1024) lays down the 
rule in these words: 'To vitiate a will there must be 
more than influence. It must be undue influence. 
To be classed as 'undue' influence it must place the 
testator in the attitude of saying, 'It is not my will, 
but I must do it.' The will or the provision assailed 
does not truly proceed from him. He becomes the 
tutored instrument of a dominant mind, which dic-
tates to him what he shall do, compels him to adopt 
its will instead of exercising his own, and by over-
coming his power of resistance impels him to do 
what he would not have done had he been free from 
its control.' " 
In re De Mont's Estate, 282 P 2d 963, the court said: 
"Mere proof of opportunity to influence a testa-
tor does not sustain a finding of undue influence, in 
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the absence of proof of pressure directed TO THE 
TESTAMENTARY ACT." 
There is not a shred of evidence in the record of any 
acts of pressure brought to bear upon Gail by Ada Bridge 
or Joseph L. Bridge which carried over to her act of execut-
ing the second codicil, in which Ada Bridge was named as 
a devisee, and some such act would have to be proved in 
evidence when the Court found that neither were present 
when the said second codicil was executed by Gail. For 
other authorities on the above see: In re Bryan's Estate, 
supra, In re Lavelle's Estate, supra, Miller V s. Livingston, 
31 Utah 415; In re Velladao's Estate, 88 P 2d 187; In re 
Lincoln's Estate, 185 Okla. 464, 94 p 2d 227; In the Estate 
of Donovan, 140 Cal. 390, 394, 73 P 1081; In re Riggin's 
Estate, 156 California, 257, 104 P 6; Calveard v. Reynolds, 
281 Ky. 518, 136 SW 2d 759, 799; In re Greenhill's Estate 
221 P 2d 310; In re Jamison's Estate 249 P 2d 859; Re 
John's Estate 25 A.L.R. 652, citing 57 Am. Jur. 260; Tate 
Vs. Murphy 18 A.L.R. 2d 892 (5, 6 and 7); 95 C.J.S. 448 
note 21, which states: 
"Uncontradicted evidence showing that the per-
son charged with exerting undue influence took no 
part in the execution of the will and had no knowl-
edge that a will had been executed may be sufficient 
to remove the issue of undue influence from the 
. " JUry. 
There is no evidence in the record that Ada Bridge 
knew that Gail was drawing a codicil making her a bequest 
therein, and as the court found, she was not present when 
it was executed by Gail. 
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Did the undue influence of Kostopulos and Mac-
farlane, who drew the Will and two codicils destroy 
the will and both codicils. 
We think not. This court in re Wilda Gail 
Swan Estate, supra, held the will and codicils valid 
except for the bequests to Macfarlane and Kostopulos. 
Section 74-1-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides: 
"A will, OR PART of a will, procured to be 
made by duress, menace, fraud or undue influence 
may be denied probate; and a revocation procured 
by the same means may be declared void." 
This statute, we think, makes it mandatory upon a 
court to find those parts of a will, not affected by the 
undue influence, valid. 
Page on Wills, Vol. 1, Page 389. 
Influence inducing part of will. 
"If part of the will is caused by undue influence 
and such undue influence does not affect the remain-
ing provisions of the will the validity of the pro-
visions which are not caused by such undue influence 
depends, in part, on whether it is possible to ascertain 
which portions are caused by the undue influence and 
whether such portions, if ascertained, can be held to 
be valid, and the rest can be given effect. 
"Where it can be shown that a part of the will 
was caused by undue influence and that the rest of 
the will was not caused thereby and the part of 
such will caused by undue influence can be separated 
from the rest, leaving it intelligible and complete in 
itself, it is held, in most states that only such part of 
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the will as is caused by undue influence is invalid and 
the rest is valid." 
69 American Law Reports, page 1129: 
. "The authorities, with but few exceptions, sup-
port the general proposition that parts of will may be 
held valid and enforceable, notwithstanding the fact 
that other parts have been affected by undue influ-
ence and are invalid; provided, however, that the 
parts so affected are separable, so that the will re-
mains complete and intelligible in itself." 
In re Estate of William T. Carothers, Deceased, 300 
Pa. 185, 150 Atl. 585; 69 A.L.R. 1127, the court said: 
"Where a provision in a will which gives a 
legacy is void because of undue influence, the will 
itself is not necessarily void nor are other legacies, 
unless such influence directly or impliedly affects 
them. Undue influence invalidates such part of a 
will as is affected ·by it. Where part of a will is 
caused by undue influence and the remainder is not 
affected by it; and the latter can be so separated as 
to leave it intelligible and complete in itself, such part 
of the will is valid and enforceable. Page on Wills, 
Sec. 131; W agners. Estate, 289 Pa. 361, 137 A. 616. 
When a will contains distinct and independent pro· 
visions, so that portions of the property or different 
estates or interests in the same portions of the prop· 
erty are created, some of which are valid and others 
invalid, the valid will be preserved, unless the pro· 
visions are so interdependent and cannot be separated 
without defeating the general intent of the testator." 
In Zeigler Vs. Coffin. 219 Ala. 586; 63 A.L.R. 942, 
123 So. 22, the court said: 
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"It is also established that though the contest 
of the Will for undue influence may be directed 
against the validity of the whole will, yet it is only if 
the will as a whole was the result of undue influence 
that it will, as a whole, he thereby avoided, for if 
a part of it only is so affected, and there are other 
parts which were the result of the free will of the 
testator, the latter may stand, although the former 
would be set aside." 
In Re Maguire, 105 Misc. 433, 173 N. Y. Su pp. 392, 
the court said: 
"Every suggestion of righteousness and good 
sense makes for the avoidance of a portion of a will 
which for any reason is found not to have been within 
the actual purposes of the testator. There would be 
a failure of justice if the same considerations which 
would clearly require the entire denial of probate 
should be helpless in the face of an equal wrong 
entirely limited to a single feature of the will." 
In Florey Vs. Florey, 24 Ala. 241, the court said: 
"The court agreed that where a legacy had been 
given through undue influence, it did not necessarily 
have the effect of rendering the whole will void, and 
that in accordance with the dictates of reason and the 
principles of natural justice, fraud or undue importu-
nity on the part of one legatee should not affect the 
other legacies which were the result of the free will of 
the testator." 
In the case of Snodgrass Vs. Smith, Colorado, 94 P 312, 
the decedent executed her will and codicil. Proponent drew 
the will and codicil and wrote herself in as a legatee. There 
were eight distinct legacies in this will, neither one, in any 
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sense, dependent upon the other, each entirely separate 
from the others and it was not even claimed by contestant 
that any of the legatees except proponent was guilty of any 
fraud or undue influence in procuring the making of the 
will, (as in Bridge's case). The court said: 
"There is an additional reason why the direction 
of a verdict was improper. There were eight distinct 
legacies ill this will, neither one, in any sense, de-
pendent on any of the others, each entirely separate 
from the others and it is not even claimed by contest-
ant that any of the legatees, except proponent was 
guilty of any fraud or undue influence IN PRO-
CURING, THE MAKING OF THE WILL. Hence, 
even if the will was void as to proponent, it does not 
necessarily follow that it was void as to other legatees. 
Where such conditions exist, the will should not have 
been revoked probate as to the undisputed legacies, 
certainly without affording these legatees an oppor-
tunity to be heard, (Aunt Bell Martsolf was a legatee, 
was never served and appeared as a witness only) 
and the proponent, as the executrix of the will, is in 
a position to determine this objection to the unwar-
ranted direction to the jury." 
The next above case cites 1 Underhill on Wills, Sec. 
159; other cases in support are Taylor Vs. Cos 153 Ill. 220, 
38 N. E. 683; Robinson Vs. Brewster 140 Ill. 649, 30 N. E. 
683, 33 Am. St. Rep. 265; Sheiler V. Bumstead, 99 Mass. 
112; In re Smith's will (Sur.) 24 N.Y.S. 928; 1 Taylor 
on Evidence (4th Ed.) Sec. 130; McCommon V s. McCom-
mon, 151 Ill. 428. 
In re Carson's Estate, California 194 P 5, the decedent 
was induced to marry her husband while he was still married 
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and by him to make him the principal legatee of her will. 
There were other beneficiaries in the will who contested the 
will upon the grounds of, first, want of due execution, second, 
undue influence upon the testatrix, alleged to have been 
exerted by Carson, and, third, fraud upon her, alleged to 
have been likewise practiced by him. The contestants were 
non-suited and appealed. On appeal the court found the 
bequest to Carson void but held the others valid. The 
court said: 
"It seems to have been assumed that in case 
the contestant showed that the will was induced by the 
alleged fraud of Carson, the entire will would fail. 
We do not so understand. There is nothing, either 
in the allegations of the CONTESTANT'S PETITION 
OR IN THEIR EVIDENCE, which would tend to show 
that any of the other beneficiaries was a party to Car-
son's alleged fraud, or that his fraud had any affect 
upon the testatrix's testamentary intentions other 
than to induce her to make him her residuary legatee 
and to appoint him as her executor. So far as the 
other beneficiaries are concerned, their situation is 
that the testatrix died leaving behind her a duly ex-
ecuted instrument, expressing her testamentary wishes 
in their favor unaffected by undue influence, fraud, 
or other vitiating circumstances. This means nothing 
more or less than that the will is perfectly valid as to 
them." The court cited 1 Schouler on Wills, Execu-
tors, and Administrators, Sec. 248; 14 Cyc. 1149; 
Section 1272 Civil Code. The court further said: 
"If it were not possible to separate the portions 
affected by the fraud from those unaffected it may 
be that the whole Will would have to fail, but that 
question is not present, as in our case) here, for 
the provision in favor of Carson are easily and com-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
84 
pletely separable from the remainder (as in our 
case). This being the situation, it is apparent that 
the beneficiaries, other than Carson, are not affected 
by the contest, and are not interested parties to it." 
Cases cited or in point are: In Re Holme's Estate 
Colorado 56 Pac. 2d 1333 at (1-2) 1335; Shelton 
V. Gordon Alabama 40 So. 2d 95; Pepin Vs. Ryan 
47 A. 2d 846, 133 Conn. 12; In re Ankeny's Estate, 
28 N.W. 2d 414, 238 Iowa 754; In re Herrley's 
Estate, Okl., 276 P. 2d 247; West Vs. Fidelity 
Baltimore Nat. Bank, 147 A. 2d 859; In re Stauf-
fer's Estate, California, 1956, 297 Pac. 2d 1029, 
the court said: 
"Applying the rules noted in the cited cases to 
the present one, the only evidence as to participation 
related to Phil pot and Kirtlan. As to the remaining 
parties named in item 7, Snyder and Wollenberg, 
there is absolutely no evidence of any kind relative to 
any activity by them in the procuring the execution 
of the will. The court specifically found this to be 
true as regarding Snyder. No finding, however, was 
made concerning W ollenherg; in fact her name is not 
even mentioned in the exhaustive memorandum opin-
ion filed by the court. Further more, with the ex-
ception of his feeling towards Snyder, as expresed 
in his will and toward his former daughter in law 
Wollenberg; in fact it was all to the contrary. Under 
such facts and circumstances it can not be said that 
the presumption of undue influence or any of the 
specific activities on the part of Philpot so affected 
the interests of Snyder and Wollenberg that it is im-
possible to determine to what extent their legacies 
were tainted with his undue influence. So far as 
Snyder and Wollenberg are concerned-their situa-
tion is that the (testator) died leaving behind (him) 
a duly executed instrument, expressing (his) testa-
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mentary wishes in their favor unaffected by undue 
influence, fraud, or other vitiating circumstances. 
This means nothing more or less than that the will is 
perfectly valid as to them. The result is that it is 
only the portion of the will in favor of (Philpot 
which) . . . should be revoked . . . the remaining 
portions continuing as a valid expression of the ( tes-
tator) testamentary intentions." Am. Dig. Wills, 
Key #161, for other cases, 69 ALR 1129. 
Certain it is that the will and codicils made specific 
devises, all separate in their nature so that the undue 
influence of Macfarlane and Kostopulos could not possibly 
taint the devise to Ada Bridge in any manner whatsoever. 
(Appendix No. 8, See) It is also certain that neither 
Macfarlane or Kostopulos would or did use undue influ-
ence for or on behalf of Ada Bridge. The evidence distinctly 
shows that Macfarlane lost two valuable pieces of property 
by drawing the second codicil (Appendixes 7, and 8). Would 
he use undue influence upon Gail to his detriment? We 
think not. Kostopulos was opposed to Gail giving anything 
to Ada Bridge (R. 183, 184) and therefor it is unthinkable 
that he would use his influence for or on behalf of Ada 
Bridge in order for her to obtain imy of the property of 
Gail Swan by her second codicil. 
The trial court seemed convinced that the undue influ-
ence of Macfarlane and Kostopulos voided the will and 
codicils of Testatrix (Appendix No. 3, Paragraphs 25, 26, 
27, 31, 32 and 33) along with Testatrix's incapacity and said 
in his memorandum decision (Appendix No. 2): 
"This case, as it relates to the beneficiary Ada 
Bridge, presents problems of particular difficqlty. 
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I AM RELUCTANT TO STRIKE DOWN THE BE-
QUEST TO ADA BRIDGE. If Wilda Gail Swan had 
been permitted to dispose of her property free from 
the domination of Kostopulos and Macfarlane, so that 
her meager mental capacity might have been freely 
exercised, and if under such circumstances she had 
made the bequest to Ada Bridge which is here under 
attack, I would be strongly inclined to sustain that 
bequest. 
"I feel constrained to find that the Will and 
Codicils are entirely void, because of the circum-
stances and in the setting in which they were signed. 
I do not believe that Wilda Gail Swan had the testa-
mentary capacity to give effect to her own will and 
desires as to the disposition of her property. 
"But even if she had testamentary capacity, 
considered in the abstract, her childish mind was 
so easily dominated and she was so completely under 
the influence of Macfarlane and Kostopulos, who 
fraudulently employed that influence to bring about 
the signing of the documents under attack, and the 
documents were so far contaminated by fraud and 
undue influence, that they must be declared null and 
void in their entirety." 
The Supreme Court, having found that Gail had testa-
mentary capacity and not very apt to be subject to undue 
influence exerted upon her by anyone for that reason, 
then appellant asks from what evidence did the court arrive 
at his conclusion as above set out? We maintain there was 
no evidence to support his conclusions and that the Supreme 
Court would have reversed him had respondents affected 
an appeal as they should have done and as they agreed 
to do. 
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On the other hand the court ignored evidence which 
tended to disprove his conclusions. In the first place, the 
giving of gifts to Ada Bridge during Gail's lifetime. (R. 620, 
630, 631 and 632). In re Levelle's Estate, supra. 
In the second place, the second codicil was executed 
more than a year before Gail's death, and the fact that 
Gail did not take steps to void the codicil during that time 
indicates there was no undue influence, In re Levelle' s Estate, 
supra. 
Complaint and Contest did not State Cause 
of Action against Appellant Ada Bridge 
Complaint and contest of Theo Hendee (Appendix No. 
1) named Ada Bridge a party defendant and alleged only 
that she was named as a devisee in testatrix's second codicil 
(Appendix No.8), evidently relying upon the theory that the 
undue influence of Macfarlane and Kostopolus vitiated the 
entire will and codicils. (Appendix No. 2) Since this is 
not the law appellants maintain that the complaint and con-
test did not state a cause of action against Ada Bridge. 
In re Gail Swan's Estate, Supra, the court said: 
"Usually such party (protestant) must PLEAD 
and prove the existence of such fact (undue influ-
ence). 
In the case of Brooks Vs. Scoville, 81 Utah 163, 17 Pac. 
2d 218 the court said: 
~'If the complaint is faulty because of mere im-
perfect or defective allegations of a material or 
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essential fact, and no special demurrer having been 
interposed, as there was not, we could well.look to the 
evidence and to the finding in considering whether 
such mere imperfect or defective allegations have or 
have not been cured . or aided. But, if the com-
plaint IS WANTING IN SUBSTANCE OF AN 
ESSENTIAL ALLEGATION AND BECAUSE 
THEREOF THE COMPLAINT DOES NOT STATE 
A CAUSE OF ACTION, neither EVIDENCE NOR 
FINDINGS will aid or cure such a defect, for, where 
the foundation of a cause of action fails, all goes to 
the ground. 
The Trial Court's Findings of· Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Judgment 
The trial court made Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law that Gail was dominated by undue influence on the 
three occasions when the will and the two codicils were exe-
cuted, by Macfarlane, Gail's attorney in drawing the will and 
two codicils, by Kostopulos and by Ada Bridge and her 
husband Joseph L. Bridge. The Supreme Court of Utah has 
decided that Macfarlane and Kostopulos did exert undue 
influence upon Gail at the times the will and codicils were 
executed, but since Ada Bridge did not appeal her case, 
because of the negligence of respondents as alleged, it now 
becomes the duty of appellants to consider every finding 
bearing upon the subject of undue influence in the light 
of the evidence, in so far as the Bridges were concerned. 
Ada Bridge and Gail were friends long before the will 
was drawn, as the evidence shows that they met in 1944. The 
will was drawn in May 2, 1947 (Appendix No. 5) by 
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Macfarlane. The Bridges knew nothing about the drawing 
of either the will or codicils. Except for ten months Gail's 
father lived with Gail and was present when the Bridges 
visited the home. There is not one shred of evidence of any 
statement made by him objecting to the friendship and asso-
ciation of Gail and the Bridges. He must not have thought 
the Bridges were after Gail's estate. There is no evidence 
that he objected to the association of Gail and the Bridges. 
The circumstances surrounding the execution of the 
second codicil differed from that of the will and the first 
codicil, which later were executed in Macfarlane's office. 
The second codicil was executed in the office of Dr. Neilsen, 
Dr. Darke having come there for the express purpose of 
determining whether Gail had testamentary capacity. They 
are doctors of good repute. They examined Gail, found that 
she had testamentary capacity and that she was not acting 
under "pressure or force" from anyone (R. 806). As far 
as the Bridges are concerned, the Court agreed with the 
doctors when it found that the Bridges were not present when 
the second codicil was executed by Gail. Gail lived more 
than a year after the second codicil was signed by her, 
during which time, if she at any time decided that she had 
been imposed upon by undue influence of any one when she 
signed said second codicil, she could have revoked the same 
and executed another. 
In re Lavelle's Estate, supra the court said: 
"There is another aspect of the case which is 
strongly persuasive that this third testament represent-
ed the will of Lucille Lavelle: It is indisputable that 
after its execution she lived for a year: about six 
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months in Ogden and about six months in the Holla-
day rest home; during this time she had comunication 
with others but made no effort to revoke the will or 
to make another." 
In re Gail Swan Estate, supra the court said: 
"The fact that Gail had testamentary capacity 
makes it more probable that she was not induced to 
make these bequests by fraud or undue influence. 
The facts that she was raised without the normal 
associations with people; that she never married; 
that she developed a desire for social contact and 
openly indicated her willingness to make gifts and he-
quests to those who associated with and befriended 
her could be regarded as indicating that she wanted 
to make such bequests of her own free will." 
In re Lavelle's Estate, supra the court said: 
" ... She gave him sums of money, some rather 
large, and items of personal property during her 
lifetime. Respondents urge that this supports their 
contention of undue influence; BUT TO THE CON-
TRARY, THE FACT THAT THEY WERE GIVEN, 
AND OVER A CONSIDERABLE PERIOD OF 
TIME, IS STRONG INDICATION OF THE CON-
STANCY OF HER AFFECTION AND REGARD 
FOR HIM CORROBORATES THE IDEA THAT 
SHE WANTED TO MAKE PROVISION FOR HIM 
IN HER WILL." 
Certainly the above statement of the court fits the 
situation of Gail and the Bridges and rebuts the Findings 
of the court Nos. 28, 33 of (Appendix No. 3). The court 
found that Bridges did not participate in the preparation of 
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the second codicil while the evidence was that not only did 
they not participate but they were not present. ( R. 804, 
805, 806, 807). There is no evidence of acts of coersion, 
exerted by the Bridges upon Gail which carried over and 
made Gail's will their own, and, subserviant to theirs, at the 
time she executed the second codicil. 
The trial court's Finding No. 16 (Appendix No. 3) 
the court said, "Joseph Lamar and Ada Bridge came to be-
lieve that Gail and HER FATHER were wealthy." It could 
be easily inferred that Gail and her father were well to do, 
but does not the law permit the poor to associate with the 
rich without inferring a wicked purpose. Mr. Swan never 
made a statement during his life time that he thought the 
Bridges were seeking their money and he lived all but 
ten months of the association of Gail and the Bridges. 
He was a careful man and watched Gail's business until 
he became too ill to do so. The court, without a shred 
of evidence, found that the Bridges gave up their own 
£rends to play cards with Gail. Was it not possible for 
them to broaden their field of friendship? There was 
no evidence that any one of Bridge's friends was neglected, 
but the trial court found that the Bridges were wicked because 
they recognized Gail's need for their love and affection and 
out of Christian hearts were willing to give Gail their love, 
a love which protestant herself refused to terminate, recog-
nizing it as the most beautiful thing in Gail's life. How is 
it that protestant recognized Bridge's love for Gail as a 
thing of beauty while the court could only see something 
direful and wicked? All the evidence rebutted the court's 
finding No. 16. The work which Mr. Bridge did for Gail 
was done under the supervision of the Walker Bank and 
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Trust Co. and not of Gail. It cannot be said that Mr. 
Bridge was employed by Gail, except indirectly, which if 
said work was not being done during the time the second 
codicil was drafted, could not be said to create a confiden-
tial relationship between Gail and Mr. Bridge, certainly not 
between Gail and Ada Bridge, the devisee. If this devise 
should fail for Ada Bridge, then it can be said, "never make 
a devise to a friend for it will fail if a relative contests it." 
But consider what the court said in the Lavelle's Estate, 
supra: 
"Where the affection and desire of a testatrix 
is genuine, it matters not that the illicit relationship 
may have played a part in inducing it." 
'The court seemed persuaded by the evidence that Mr. 
Bridge kissed Gail in the presence of others! Mr. Bridge 
was ·not the devisee! 
Let us consider for a moment whether Gail's will re· 
suited from overpowering or from her genuine affection for 
Ada Bridge. Mrs. Martsolf testified that Gail was strong· 
minded and could not be easily talked out of things ( R. 302, 
303) . She further testified that Gail was rebellious against 
the strong restraint that had been imposed upon her by her 
father; that she wanted to dispose of her money in her own 
way (R. 282, 283). Mortensen testified that she had a mind 
of her own (R. 476, 478). Gail discharged one lawyer, 
Snyder, and withdrew her documents from his office after he 
had done work for her over a considerable period of time 
in order to hire Macfarlane (R. 188, 189). She discharged 
Tracy-Collins even though she had been a friend of Kipp for 
many years, after a misunderstanding over placing certain 
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moneys in her personal account ( R. 159). When she didn't 
think Dr. Cowan and Dr. Pace were helping her she changed 
to Dr. Frank (R. 423, 424). Gail discharged Mrs. Folden 
when she insinuated that Gail had taken some theater tickets 
from Mrs. Folden's purse (R. 438, 450-453, 532, 533). 
When Gail became dissatisfied with her newly installed 
kitchen equipment she insisted, at the inconvenience of every-
one concerned, that it be detached and returned ( R. 698, 
699). Further indication of Gail's strength of mind was 
her firm instruction to Mortensen not to let Theo know 
anything about her business, and her statement to Macfarlane 
that if he discussed her affairs with Theo again he would 
get his walking papers, and also her refusal to discuss the 
contents of her will with Theo two months before her death 
(R. 128, 488, 726). While Gail was receptive to acts of 
kindness and friendship, she was not receptive to opposition 
or efforts to unduly influence her life. She resented any 
effort to interfere with her free will. She CERTAINLY 
DID NOT HAVE SUCH A WEAK AND VACILLATING 
CHARACTER AS TO BE UNDULY INFLUENCED OVER 
A PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS, THE TIME ADA BRIDGE 
WAS ACQUAINTED WITH GAIL. 
As indicative of the length to which the trial court was 
willing to go, consider the finding that "neither Ada Bridge 
nor her husband, Joseph Lamar Bridge, participated in the 
preparation of the will or either of the codicils, but the court 
finds that the bequest of Ada Bridge was the result of undue 
influence exercised upon Gail Swan by Ada and Joseph 
Lamar, Bridge, who occupied a confidential relationship 
with Gail." (Appendix No. 3, Finding No. 28). 
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Even though the Bridges had no knowledge of Gail's 
plan of devise, no knowledge that the will and codicils exist-
ed, weren't present when the documents were prepared or 
executed, had no relationship with Macfarlane or Kostopulos, 
nevertheless the trial court was willing to follow counsel 
for contestant and make a finding of undue influence, even 
in the face of protestant's testimony that the friendship be-
tween Gail and the Bridges was a beautiful thing. Just how 
far can a trial court go in making inferrences from nothing 
and against positive evidence? 
The term "confidential relationship" has been given 
much attention by the trial court. Any person for whom 
another has a genuine feeling of affection and admiration, 
is a confidant, the degree of confidence depending on the 
individual circumstances. The usual and natural thing is for 
a confidant to be the one upon whom another's bounty is 
bestowed. Here Gail had a genuine and sincere affection for 
the Bridges. She was deeply appreciative of their many 
kindnesses. Also, she had a genuine feeling of sympathy 
for Macfarlane and the Bridges. There is no contrary 
evidence. Theo, Aunt Bell, Grace Folden, Dr. and Mrs. 
Frank, the chief witnesses for contestant, all conceded these 
facts. And affection, gratitude and sympathy are the strong-
est and most impelling motives for making a devisee. The 
trial court has in effect conceded that such were Gail's 
motives where it finds that Gail "was unusually susceptible 
to any show of friendship," "that difficulty brought on un-
usual sympathy from Gail" "the confidential nature of 
their relationship had been made stronger as the years went 
by," "the complete confidence and trust she put in them" 
(Appendix No. 3, Findings 8, 17, 23, 32). The cause of 
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Gail's affection for these people was their many acts of 
kindness, their many services, their consideration. The 
cause of her sympathy for the Bridges was their unfortunate 
financial circumstances, and for Macfarlane his series of per-
sonal misfortunes. Gail's reaction was Christian, was the 
natural reaction of a loyal and grateful friend. The trial 
court cynically mistook kindness and generosity on the 
parts of Gail and the Bridges for greed, malice and decep-
tion, when on the part of both it was the practice of Christian 
principles. The court completely ignored the true meaning 
of the word "undue" in the phrase undue influence. 
Authorities 
The In Re Lavelle's Estate, supra, is a case practically 
in every point exactly like this one, except that there was 
no question but what the relation was a confidential relation-
ship, as both Hogg and lmmerthal were employed by de-
cedent when the will and codicils were executed; they had 
opportunity, decedent's physical condition was weak; there 
were illicit sexual relations (Mr. Bridge merely kissed de-
cedent.) BUT THEY WERE NOT PRESENT WHEN THE 
WILL AND CODICILS were executed (the Bridges likewise 
were not present), and therefore the Supreme Court reversed 
the trial court. Another fact existed in Lavelle's case. 
It was completely unnatural, as decedent devised all her 
property to Hogg and Immerthal equally, while she had 
legal heirs surviving her. It is beyond understanding of 
appellant to see how the trial court could arrive at such a 
finding with the Lavelle case before it. 
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In the Lavelle case, the lower court admitted the second 
will to probate, rejecting the third on the ground that it 
had been induced by the undue influence of Immerthal 
and Hogg. The appeal challenged sufficiency of the evi-
dence to sustain the court's finding of undue influence. It 
appeared that from May of 1947 until her death in July of 
1950, Mrs. Lavelle was a bedridden invalid, paralyzed on 
her left side and suffering from certain kidney and urinary 
disorders. Her closest relatives lived out of the state; so, 
except for the first six weeks after the onset of her illness, 
when her half-sister, Kathleen Miller, was with her, she 
had to be cared for entirely by hired personnel. Though 
Mrs. Miller was legal guardian of the invalid from August, 
1947 to May, 1948, the responsibility of seeing to the 
decedent's wants developed largely upon Immerthal, a suc-
cession of over twenty housekeepers and nurses, and W. H. 
Loos, trust officer for the First Security Bank of Utah, 
who for a time administered a trust for Mrs. Lavelle and 
later became guardian of her estate. 
Immerthal was a male nurse and masseur, who visited 
Mrs. Lavelle almost daily in the course of his professional 
responsibilities. With the passage of time he took more and 
more interest in her welfare. He helped find replacements 
for the nurses and housekeepers and it was from this associ-
ation and service to the testatrix that the supposed undue 
influence resulted. 
Hogg was employed by Mrs. Lavelle as her carpenter to 
transform part of her home into rental rooms. Later he 
moved into the home, forming with her an attachment seem-
ingly of great warmth, and as the court found, sustained an 
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illicit relationship. Concerning this particular evidence 
the court stated: 
"Conceding the impropriety of their intimacy 
and also remembering that the motives of a man 
who formed such a liason with a partially paralyzed 
woman older than himself (she was almost 60, he in 
his early 50's) certainly would be suspect, yet those 
circumstances alone, which in the main form the 
basis of the respondents' case as to Hogg, do not 
support a finding of undue influence with respect to 
the making of the will." 
The court then considered the evidence concerning 
undue influence on the part of lmmerthal. 
"As to lmmerathal, there is no direct evidence 
of undue influence. It is true that he interested him-
self in the management of Mrs. Lavelle's personal af-
fairs (in January of 1950, after the execution of 
the third will, he became guardian of her person). 
In view of the fact that none of her relatives mani-
fested suchl interest, this seems to have been a fortu-
nate circumstance for her welfare. He helped to 
arrange for her care when she stayed at home, by 
artifice managed to get around her resistance to 
entering the hospital and used similar means to get 
her into a rest home about six months prior to her 
death (there is no evidence of the use of artifice 
by the Bridges and especially Ada Bridge)." 
"Thel directions first given with respect to the 
third will did not include lmmerthal as a beneficiary. 
As he apparently neither liked nor approved of Hogg, 
it is unlikely that he had exerted any undue influ-
ence upon decedent IN HOGG'S BEHALF (as Mac-
farlane and Kostopulos had good reasons not to use 
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undue influence upon Gail on behalf of Ada Bridge). 
To get Mrs. Lavelle to include him as a part bene-
ficiary, it would seem that Immerthal WOULD 
HAVE HAD TO EXERCISE AT LEAST SOME IN-
FLUENCE DURING THE ONE-DAY PERIOD BE-
TWEEN THE LAWYER'S FIRST AND SECOND 
VISITS WITH HER. There is no evidence of any 
such occurrence. 
"We are aware that ' . . . undue influence is 
seldom subject to direct proof, but, as a general rule, 
must be established by inferences and circumstances 
. . . '; but it must also be kept in mind that '. . . it 
likewise is true that a finding of undue influence 
cannot rest upon mere suspicision. There must be 
some substantial facts upon which the inferences and 
deductions are based, and the circumstances relied 
on should clearly point out the person who it is 
alleged exercised the undue influence and HIS ACTS 
CONSTITUTING THE ALLEGED UNDUE IN-
FLUENCE.' " 
The court, in holding as a matter of law that there 
was insufficient evidence to support a finding of undue 
influence, stated as follows: 
"To declare a will invalid upon the showing 
made in this case would unduly limit the right of a 
competent but bedfast person, ill and in dire need 
of help, to leave her property to the individuals who 
serve her in the extremity of need. THE TESTA-
TRIX SHOULD NOT BE PREVENTED FROM DE-
VISING HER PROPERTY ACCORDING TO HER 
OWN WISHES MEEELY BECAUSE AN OPPOR-
TUNITY FOR UNDUE INFLUENCE EXISTS; nor 
should the beneficiaries be deprived of their devise 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
49 
because such opportunity arose through their service 
to and ASSOCIATION with her. 
"Viewing the evidence and every fair inference 
therefrom most favorably to the finding of the trial 
court, we cannot find it sufficient to support the 
conclusion reached that the third and last will was 
induced by undue influence. (Hogg did not appeal 
the trial court's findings that the will and codicils 
resulted from Hogg's undue influence). The cause 
was remanded to the District Court for the purpose 
of having that instrument probated as the last will 
and testament of Lucille Lavelle." (Note that the 
court did not strike down the devise to Hogg) 
For other cases see: In re Bullock's Estate, Calif. 1956, 
295 Pac. 2d 954; Estate of Reay, Minn. 1957, 81 N.W. 
2d 277; Sterling V. Kramer, 145 N. E. (2d) 757; In re · 
Farmer's Estate 123 A.2d 630; Estate of Doty, 201 Pac. 
2d 823. 
CONCLUSION 
We summarize the following clearly established propo-
sitions of law and fact: 
(1) A lawyer who fails to pedect his client's appeal 
is liable for all the natural and proximate damages resulting 
therefrom. 
( 2) In an action against an attorney for failure to 
perfect an appeal, the client must plead and prove that the 
appellate court would have reversed the trial court had the 
attorney perfected the appeal. 
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( 3) In an action against his attorney for failure to 
perfect an appeal, the trial court must determine what the 
appellate court would have done had the attorney perfected 
the appeal. 
( 4) Contestant had the burden of proving undue in-
fluence by a preponderance of the evidence. 
( 5) Friendship is not a "confidential relation". 
( 6) Unless there is a confidential relationship, a 
finding of undue influence cannot be based on a presump· 
tion or upon mere inferrence, innuendo or suspicion. 
( 7) There was no collusion or joint effort on the 
part of Macfarlane, Kostopulos and the Bridges. 
(8) Gail's second codicil was valid except for the 
bequests made to Macfarlane and Kostopu1os. 
( 9) Gail demonstrated over a period of years a 
consistent desire to reward her close friends for their kind-
nesses to her, not only by expressions of appreciation but 
by gifts and by remembrance in her will and codicils. 
(10) Gail had an abiding affection for the Bridges, 
and considered them to be her family. 
( 11) Gail appeared competent and normal to the 
witnesses to the will and codicils. 
( 12) The will and codicils were admitted to probate 
before contest and attesting witnesses swore to the fact that 
no undue influence was exerted upon Gail when the same 
were executed. 
( 13) The second codicil, in which Ada Bridge was 
given a bequest, was actually witnessed by a medical doctor 
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and a psychiatrist, who testified that Gail talked freely and 
understandingly about her friends and relatives, about her 
business and property interests, and about the contents of 
the second codicil; that they questioned her in private about 
whether she was under "force or pressure" from anyone, 
and that her answer was "No."; that she appeared calm and 
businesslike, and stated that the codicil expressed her 
desires. 
( 14) The will and codicils were in existence five 
years during which time Gail was a free agent mingling 
freely with friends and relatives, and during all that time 
she was never known to say that her will and codicils were 
not her own; that she lived a whole year after executing 
the second codicil and during that time she could have 
changed the second codicil if it did not conform to her 
wishes. 
(15) During the five years Gail and the Bridges 
associated as very close friends, Gail gave the Bridges 
gifts, which proved her love of them and that she desired 
to give them a bequest in her second codicil. 
(16) Undue influence to vitiate a will must be exer-
cised at the very time and in the very act of execution. 
( 17) Kostopulos would not use undue influence on 
behalf of the Bridges as he was against Gail giving gifts to 
the Bridges and wanted to put a stop to it. 
( 18) Macfarlane did not use undue influence upon 
Gail in behalf of the Bridges, or anyone else, in the drawing 
of the second codicil as he lost two very valuable pieces of 
real estate property by drawing of the second codicil, valued 
in excess of $24,000.00. 
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( 19) The undue influence of Macfarlane and Kos-
topulos did not taint the entire will and codicils; that the 
bequest to Ada Bridge was separable from all other be-
quests; that all bequests, not obtained by undue influence 
should have been declared valid by the trial court and 
probated, including the one to Ada Bridge, and also to Mrs. 
Martsol£. 
(20) THERE ISN'T A WHISPER OF EVIDENCE 
THAT GAIL WAS EVER ENCOURAGED, FORCED, OR 
OTHERWISE INDUCED TO PERFORM SO MUCH AS 
A SINGLE ACT AGAINST HER DESIRES, BY ADA 
BRIDGE, OR HER HUSBAND, EITHER AT THE TIME 
THE WILL AND CODICILS WERE EXECUTED, OR 
AT ANY OTHER TIME OR THAT ANYONE ELSE USED 
FORCE OR UNDUE INFLUENCE ON THEIR BEHALF. 
( 21) Complaint and contest failed to state a cause of 
action against Ada Bridge. 
(22) The Court should have granted Ada Bridge's 
motion for nonsuit. 
From the foregoing we respectfully submit that this 
Honorable Court should reverse the summary judgment en-
tered by the court, determine that it would have reversed the 
trial court in regard to the bequest to Ada Bridge had de-
fendants and respondents perfected Ada Bridge's appeal, 
return this action to the Salt Lake County District Court 
for the determination whether or not appellants and re-
spondents entered into an agreement to appeal and determine 
the damages suffered by appellants for respondent's failure 
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to appeal, and for other and further relief which to the court 
should deem just in the premises. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Glen Y. Richards 
Counsel for Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, Ada Bridge and 
Joseph L. Bridge, 
313 Judge Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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APPENDIX NO. 1 
COMPLAINT AND CONTEST 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Third Judicial District 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
In the Matter of the Estate 
of l 
WILDA GAIL SWAN, Deceased, 
THEO SWAN HENDEE, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
WALKER BANK AND TRUST COM-
PANY, EXECUTOR OF THE LAST 
WILL AND TESTAMENT OF WILDA 
GAIL SWAN, deceased; GRANT MAC-
FARLANE; DANIEL KOSTOPULOS; 





Comes now Theo Swan Hendee and for cause of action 
against the defendants alleges: 
l. That on the 20th day of May, 1952, Wilda Gail 
Swan, a resident of the City and County of Salt Lake, State 
of Utah, died leaving an estate consisting of both real and 
personal property, and leaving plaintiff, Theo Swan Hendee, 
as her sole surviving heir at law. 
2. That on the 25th day of June, 1952, certain papers 
purporting to be the last will and testament of Wilda Gail 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
Swan, bearing dates the 2nd day of May, 1947, the 20th 
day of February, 1950, and the 23rd day of April, 1951, 
were admitted to probate by the District Court, Probate 
Division, o£ the State of Utah in and for Salt Lake County, 
Wilda Gail Swan will be referred to sometimes hereinafter 
as .Gail. 
3. That the defendant, Walker Bank and Trust Com-
pany, a banking and fiduciary corporation of the State of 
Utah, with its principal place of business in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, was named executor in said pretended will, was duly 
qualified as such and was and now is the acting executor 
under said pretended will. 
4. That the defendants, Grant MacFarlane, Daniel 
Kostopulos and Ada Bridge are named as beneficiaries 
under said purported will; that the plaintiff, Theo Swan 
Hendee, is the natural sister and sole heir of said Wilda Gail 
Swan, and is named as one of the beneficiaries in said pur-
ported will. 
5. That the said Gail was, on the date said purported 
will and codicil were signed, physically ill, mentally in-
competent, of unsound mind, and lacked testamentary ca-
pacity to properly execute said purported will and codicils. 
6. When she was a child of the age of about eight 
years the said Gail became afflicted by a disease known as 
epilepsy and by all of its attendant nervous disorders. The 
said Gail continued, thereafter, for the balance of her life 
to he a victim of such illness. Soon after the onset of such 
affliction it became necessary for the said Gail to be with-
drawn from school and she was never thereafter well enough 
to resume her schooling. It was necessary for her to remain 
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at home under the constant care and attention of her mother 
and her family by reason of which her childhood lacked the 
contacts and activities of normal children. As she grew 
older she continued to live the life of a recluse and, for the 
control of her illness, she was required to be at all times 
under the care of a physician and, from day to day, to take 
sedatives and other drugs and treatments. 
7. Because of her persistent illness and the sequestered 
nature of her existence the said Gail developed a strong and 
pressing desire for outside friendships and attention and 
in her later life she became abnormally responsive to any 
show of friendship or attention and especially to the at-
tentions of men. 
8. During the last few years of her life Gail was the 
owner of substantial property, most of which consisted of 
real estate located in Salt Lake City. The defendant, Mac-
Farlane, became acquainted with Gail and learned about her 
possession and expected inheritance from her aged father. 
He also learned of Gail's illness and her easy susceptibility 
to any show of friendship or interest. He thereupon set out 
to insinuate himself into the special favor and good graces 
of Gail. By the artful use of blandishment and guile and 
the persistent show of friendship and interest for her, he 
wormed his way into the inner confidence of the said Gail. 
Thus cunningly and persistently he gained domination over 
the mind and will of the said Gail and established himself 
as her trusted friend, business advisor, lawyer and attorney 
in fact. 
9. Having thus secured himself in the trust and full 
confidence of the said Gail, Macfarlane was able to, and 
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did, substitute his own will and judgment for hers in the 
management and disposition of her property. He was able 
to, and did, fraudulently induce the said Gail to transfer 
to him, in her lifetime, substantial sums of money and 
securities of substantial value. By reason of such gifts and 
the fact that MacFarlane was attorney in fact for Gail, she 
became partially dependent upon him for her income and 
living expenses. In the circumstances above set forth 
the said MacFarlane was able to do, and did, fraudulently and 
by the exercise of undue influence induce the said Gail to 
sign the pretended will and codicils attached thereto, all of 
which are referred to in paragraph 2 above. Said pretended 
will and codicils purported to devise to MacFarlane property 
of approximate value of $95,000. 
10. The defendant, Daniel Kostopulos, is and was 
an operator of a motion picture theater in Salt Lake City. 
During the last years of her life, the said Gail was a frequent 
patron of said theater whereby she became acquainted with 
the defendant Kostopulos. Kostopulos, recognizing that the 
said Gail was afflicted in health, made pretense and show of 
friendship and interest in the said Gail and after gaining 
her acquaintance became a frequent visitor at her home. 
He, like MacFarlane, learned of Gail's possessions and of 
her easy susceptibility to any show of friendship or interest 
by men. He, therefore, set out to insinuate himself into 
the good graces of said Gail and by persistent show of 
friendship and interest gained her full and complete trust 
and confidence. By constant small attentions and frequent 
visits he prevailed upon the said Gail to believe he had a 
wholly unselish and friendly interest in her and her prop· 
erty. Having thus established himself he was able to, and 
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did, substitute his mind and will for that of the said Gail, 
whereby he induced her to transfer to him during her life-
time, substantial sums of money and securities of substan-
tial value, as a result of which, she became partially depend-
ent upon him for her income and living expenses. To 
further his purpose to gain the confidence and trust of the 
said Gail, the said Kostopulos fraudulently and wrongfully 
stated to the said Gail, from time to time, that her sister, 
Theo Swan Hendee, plaintiff herein, had the intention of 
causing the said Gail to be committed to a mental institution 
and to deprive her of her property and her freedom. By 
such means the said Kostopulos was successful in partially 
alienating the affection and respect of the said Gail for her 
sister Theo, correspondingly increasing his power and domi-
nation over the mind of said Gail. Having captured the 
complete trust and confidence of the said Gail, the said Kos-
topulos was able to, and did fraudulently and by the exercise 
of undue influence induce the said Gail to sign the will and 
codicils above referred to in which provision is made for the 
gift to the said Kostopulos of property of the approximate 
value of $90,000. 
II. That the purported will and codicils thereto were 
prepared by the said MacFarlane, acting as attorneys for 
said Wilda Gail Swan, and that said documents were not 
in fact the last will of the said Gail Swan, but were signed 
by her under duress and undue influence of others, to-wit, 
the said Grant MacFarlane and Daniel Kostopulos. 
WHEREFORE, your petitioner prays that upon appro-
priate proceedings had, this court enter its order and judg-
ment adjudicating and decreeing that the said will and 
codicils thereto of Wilda Gail Swan are not in truth and in 
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fact the will· of the said Wilda Gail Swan, hut represent the 
will of the said Grant MacFarlane and the said Daniel Kos-
topulos; that at the time said purported will and codicils 
were signed, the said Wilda Gail Swan was physically ill, 
mentally incompetent, of unsound mind, and lacked testa-
mentary capacity to properly execute the same; that said 
purported will and codicils thereto he declared null, void 
and of no force and effect; that the estate of which Wilda 
Gail Swan died seized and possessed, both real and per-
sonal, be distributed to Theo Swan Hendee, the natural sister 
and only heir of Wilda Gail Swan, deceased. 
Plaintiff's Address: 
300 Moncada Way 
San Francisco 12, California 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
By GRANT C. AADNESEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
921 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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APPENDIX NO. 2 
PAGE 6 OF MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The record in this case makes it clear to me that Kos-
topulos was guilty of fraud and undue influence, and without 
such fraud and influence the disposition of Wilda Gail 
Swan's property would have been otherwise than as desig-
nated in her first and second Codicils, and I find that both 
of said instruments are null and void. 
I conclude it is appropriate to summarize the result of 
the exploitations by Macfarlane and Kostopulos of the con-
fidential relationship which they enjoyed with Wilda Gail 
Swan. During Miss Swan's lifetime Kostopulos and Mac-
farlane each received without consideration approximately 
$9,500.00 in money and securities. Macfarlane in addition 
was compensated for legal services rendered. Kostopulos 
received with Macfarlane's approval a 10-year lease upon 
a valuable piece of business property. By the purported 
testamentary documents, Kostopulos and Macfarlane would 
each receive property appraised at nearly $100,000.00. In 
addition each was bequeathed fire insurance policies, a fact 
which Macfarlane characterized as unusual. The second 
Codicil discloses that Macfarlane was designated the attor-
ney for the estate and Kostopulos authorized to make the 
funeral arrangements. 
If the Will and Codicils were allowed to stand, Kosta-
pulos and Macfarlane between them would profit by their 
confidential relationship with Wilda Gail Swan in an amount 
totaling about one quarter of a million dollars. To permit 
such a result in the face of the record made in the trial of 
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this cause would, in my opinion, stultify the law and the 
bench and the bar. Therefore, I conclude that the purported 
Will and· both Codicils must be held null and void, insofar 
as they would vest any property or thing of value to either 
Macfarlane or Kostopulos. 
THIS CASE, AS IT RELATES TO THE BENE-
FICIARY ADA BRIDGE, PRESENTS PROBLEMS OF 
PARTICULAR DIFFICULTY. I AM RELUCTANT TO 
STRIKE DOWN THE BEQUEST OF ADA BRIDGE. IF 
WILDA GAIL SWAN HAD BEEN PERMITTED TO DIS-
POSE OF HER PROPERTY FREE FROM THE DOMI-
NATION OF KOSTOPULOS AND MACFARLANE, SO 
THAT HER MEAGER· MENTAL CAPACITY MIGHT 
HAVE BEEN FREELY EXERCISED, AND IF UNDER 
SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES SHE HAD MADE THE BE-
·QUEST TO ADA BRIDGE WHICH IS HERE UNDER 
ATTACK, I WOULD BE STRONGLY INCLINED TO 
SUSTAIN THAT BEQUEST. 
I feel constrained to find that the Will and Codicils 
are entirely void, because of the circumstances and in the 
setting in which they were signed. I do not believe that 
Wilda Gail Swan had the testamentary capacity to give 
effect to her own will and desires as to the disposition of her 
property. 
But even if she had testamentary capacity, considered 
in the abstract, her childish mind was so easily dominated 
and she was so completely under the influence of Mac-
farlane and Kostopulos, who fraudulently employed that in-
fluence to bring about the signing of the documents under 
attack, and the documents were so far contaminated by 
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fraud and undue influence, that they must be declared null 
and void in their entirety. 
As heretofore stated, I conclude that this contest must 
be sustained upon both grounds alleged in the complaint: 
I. That Wilda Gail Swan was incompetent to make the 
Will or Codicils. 
2. That in any event, the Will and Codicils were the 
product of and resulted from fraud and undue influence of 
both Macfarlane and Kostopulos. 
Counsel for the contestant are therefore requested to 
prepare and submit Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law, and 
Judgment, giving effect to the views expressed hereinbefore. 
Dated at Ogden, Utah, this 14th day of April, 1954. 
BY THE COURT, 
PARLEY E. NORSETH 
Judge 
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APPENDIX NO. 3 
PAGES 8 TO 17 INCLUSIVE OF THE COURT'S FIND-
INGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
16. Ada Bridge is the wife of Joseph Lamar Bridge. 
She is young enough to have been the daughter of Gail 
Swan. She and her husband maintained a small chicken 
farm in connection with their home in the south part of 
Salt Lake County. During the late war Ada Bridge's hus-
band was in the military service. While he was away Mrs. 
Bridge sold eggs and poultry and among her customers 
were Grant Swan and his daughter, Gail. She made deliv-
eries from time to time and formed an acquaintance with 
Gail. After his return from the service Ada Bridge's husband 
joined his wife in visiting the Swan home. During the 
last two years of Gail's life Ada Bridge and her husband 
visited the Swan home several nights a week, and on fre-
quent occasions took Gail Swan to their home. The Bridges 
had six children and a home to look after. Mr. Bridge 
had a business to pursue. They had friends of their own 
age and with the same interests, and yet during the last two 
years of Gail's life they left their home and their children 
and drove into the Swan home to play cards with Gail sev-
eral nights each week. Ada Bridge's husband was employed 
on at least two occasions to perform work in connection with 
the maintenance and repair of some of the Swan properties. 
Joseph Lamar and Ada Bridge came to believe that Gail 
and her father were wealthy. Gail endeavored to give 
Bridge's husband $3,000.00 to be used in the finishing 
of a house which he had under construction. Mr. Bridge 
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claims to have refused to accept the money as a gift but 
went with her to the bank where she drew out of her savings 
account $3,000.00 in cash and delivered it to him. In 
consideration for such cash Mr. Bridge claims to have 
written a note by which he promised to repay the sum. The 
note could not be produced at the trial but Mr. Bridge testi-
fied that it provided for no interest, and provided no time 
at which the repayment would become due. $2100.00 of 
the amount advanced to Mr. Bridge was never repaid, but 
credits in that amount were given to Mr. Bridge by Gail. 
The court finds that the persistent attentions of the Bridges 
to Gail Swan was motivated by a desire to gain her trust and 
confidence in the hope of profiting from such show of 
kindness. 
17. The will admitted to probate and under attack 
in these proceedings is dated May 2, 1947. By that time 
Macfarlane had been Gail Swan's attorney at law for nearly 
three years. He must have known, and the court finds that 
he did know, not only that Gail's mind was childish and 
undeveloped, but that she was emotionally immature and 
highly susceptible to any show of kindness and friendship. 
During the period of his confidential relationship with Gail 
Swan, Macfarlane suffered an in jury to one of his eyes 
which required surgery. That difficulty brought an un-
usual sympathy from Gail Swan and Macfarlane employed 
the difficulty with his eyes to play upon the sympathy and 
emotions of his client. 
18. The will was drawn by defendant Macfarlane in 
his office. On that occasion Gail called at Macfarlane's 
office entirely alone. She brought with her a prior will 
under the terms of which she bequeathed' and devised her 
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estate to her father. Macfarlane then and there prepared 
the will now under attack and caused it to be attested by two 
witnesses of his own selection, one of whom was his private 
secretary. By the terms of the will he was made the bene-
ficiary of property having a value of nearly $100,000.00. At 
the time the will was prepared by Macfarlane and signed 
by Gail Swan she had no independent advice of any kind, 
but relied solely for advice upon Macfarlane. 
19. The first codicil admitted to probate and now 
under attack is dated February 20, 1950. Between the 
signing of the will of May 2, 1947, and the signing of the 
first codicil on February 20, 1950, there had been no 
interruption in or weakening of the confidential relation-
ship between Macfarlane and Gail Swan. On the contrary, 
the relationship had continued and as time went on Gail 
Swan's trust and confidence in Grant Macfarlane increased. 
22. As attorney-in-fact and attorney at law and con-
fidential adviser, Macfarlane approved the sale of a piece of 
unimproved real estate by Gail Swan, the proceeds of which 
were invested in corporate stocks and U. S. Government 
bonds. The stocks and bonds consisted of 100 shares of 
stock of Utah Power and Light Company, 80 shares of 
Westinghouse Electric Company, and $3000.00 per value 
of U. S. Government bonds. As attorney-in-fact for Gail 
Swan, Macfarlane took delivery from Walker Bank and 
Trust Company of the corporate stock of Utah Power and 
Light and Westinghouse Electric Company. Thereafter, 
and in the month of April, 1951, Macfarlane received from 
Gail Swan the 80 shares of Westinghouse Electric Company 
of the value of approximately $3000.00 and $1500.00 par 
value of U. S. Government bonds. He also caused the 
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shares of Utah Power and Light Company to be transferred 
from the name of Gail Swan to the name of Daniel Kos-
topulos, and permitted Gail Swan to deliver the Utah 
Power and Light stock of the approximate value of $3000.00 
and $1500.00 par value of U. S. bonds to Daniel Kostopulos. 
The court finds that acceptance of the stock and bonds from 
Gail Swan by Macfarlane and Kostopulos was entirely with-
out consideration and was in furtherance of their design and 
purpose to abuse their confidential relationship with Gail 
Swan and procure her property for their own benefit. 
23. The second codicil to Gail Swan's will is dated 
April 23, 1951. By then Macfarlane had been Gail Swan's 
attorney at law and confidential friend and business adviser 
for nearly seven years. The confidential nature of their 
relationship had been made stronger as the years went by, 
and Gail Swan's trust and confidence in Macfarlane was 
complete. He had then been her attorney in fact for one 
year. He knew that Gail was then immature both mentally 
and emotionally. He also knew that Daniel Kostopulos had 
acquired a highly confidential relationship to Gail Swan, 
and that he was a serious rival for Gail's generosity. He 
and Kostopulos were by that time doubtful of Gail's mental 
capacity to make a testamentary disposition of her property. 
Macfarlane prepared the second codicil and on this occasion, 
as on all others, Gail had no independent advice with respect 
to the disposition of her property. Instead of having office 
help attest the second codicil, Macfarlane made an appoint-
ment with a doctor who was a total stranger to Gail Swan, 
and entirely unacquainted with her illness. He arranged 
to have an examination made by Dr. A. M. Nielsen. He 
then arranged to have Kostopulos bring Gail Swan to Dr. 
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Nielsen's office where she could be examined and where 
she could sign the will. Kostopulos took Gail to Dr. 
Nielsen's office where Macfarlane was waiting for them. 
Dr. Nielsen made a physical examination. He then called 
in Dr. Roy A. Darke, and the two of them examined Gail 
Swan and then and there signed the second codicil as at-
testing witnesses. Macfarlane and Kostopulos were both 
present when the second codicil was signed, but were not 
present during some of the conversations between the doctors 
and Gail Swan. When they were not in the actual presence 
of Gail Swan they were in the adjoining room, and the effect 
of their influence upon Gail Swan was never dissipated. 
24. Drs. Darke and Nielsen both testified that Gail 
Swan was competent to sign the codicil for the reason that 
she understood the nature of her property and had clearly 
in mind the persons who were to benefit by her will. They 
both testified that upon inquiry of Gail Swan as to who 
were to be beneficiaries under her will she gave them the 
name of Oscar Burnside Beam, her brother-in-law Harold 
Hendee, and Ada Bridge's husband, Joseph Lamar Bridge. 
All three persons so named by Gail Swan as she was about 
to sign the codicil were omitted from the codicil. The court 
therefore finds that Gail Swan did not understand who was 
benefitting by the second codicil she had signed in Dr. Niel-
sen's office, and that the document which she signed did not 
give effect to the testamentary intentions expressed by her 
to the doctors at the very time she signed the codicils. 
25. The court finds that at the time when Gail Swan 
signed the will on May 2, 1947, she was under the influ-
ence and domination of Grant Macfarlane; that her mentality 
was too weak to withstand the effect of such influence; that 
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she therefore lacked testamentary capacity to make the will. 
The court further finds that the will was the result of the 
undue influence of Grant Macfarlane. 
26. The court finds that when the first codicil was 
made on February 20, 1950, Gail Swan did not have mental 
capacity to make a testamentary disposition of her property 
because her childish and imature mind was unable to resist, 
and could not resist, the domination and influence of Mac-
farlane. The court further finds that said codicil was pro-
duced by the undue influence of Macfarlane. 
27. The court finds that when the second codicil was 
made on the 23rd way of April, 1951, Gail Swan was under 
the influence and domination of Macfarlane and Kostopulos, 
and did not have the mental capacity to make a testamentary 
disposition of her property. The court further finds that 
said codicil did not express the free and voluntary will of 
Gail Swan, but was the result of undue influence then and 
there practised upon her by Macfarlane and Kostopulos. 
28. The court finds that the relationship between Ada 
Bridge and her husband on the one side, and Gail Swan on 
the other, was a confidential relationship. The will and 
both codicils were prepared by Macfarlane, and Kostopulos 
participated in the preparation and execution of the second 
codicil. Neither Ada Bridge nor her husband, Joseph La-
ar Bridge, participated in the preparation of the will or either 
of the codicils, but the court finds that the bequest to Ada 
Bridge was the result of undue influence exercised upon Gail 
Swan by Ada and Joseph Lamar Bridge, who occupied a 
confidential relationship with Gail. 
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29. The court finds that the will and both of the 
codicils were the result of fraud and undue influence and 
therefore did not express the free and voluntary will of 
Gail Swan. 
30. The court finds that Gail Swan's mind was so 
undeveloped that under the circumstances and in the setting 
surrounding the signing of the will and the two codicils 
under attack in these proceedings, she was unable to give 
any free and independent exercise to what mentality she had 
and was, therefore, mentally incompetent and lacked testa-
mentary capacity to execute and make a valid testamentary 
disposition of her property at the time she signed the pur-
ported will and each of the codicils. 
31. The court finds that at the time Gail Swan signed 
the will of May 2, 194 7, she was so far under the influence 
and domination of Grant Macfarlane that said will was 
the product of Macfarlane's influence and expressed his will 
and desire and not the will and desire of Gail Swan. 
32. The court finds that when the codicils of Feb-
ruary 20, 1950, and April 23, 1951, were signed by Gail 
Swan, she was so far under the influence and domination 
of Macfarlane and Kostopulos that such codicils were the 
product of Macfarlane's and Kostopulos' influence, and 
expressed the wills and desires of Macfarlane and Kosto-
pulos and not the will and desires of Gail Swan. By reason 
of their confidential relationship to Gail Swan, and the 
complete confidence and trust she put in them, they were 
able to and did substitute their wills for hers. 
33. The court finds that while Ada Bridge took no 
active part in the preparation of the will or either codicil, 
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all three documents were prepared by Macfarlane, and 
Kostopulos was present and participated in the events 
leading up to and including the signing of the second codicil. 
The purported will and first codicil were so far a product 
of undue influence of Macfarlane, and the second codicil 
was so far the product of undue influence of Macfarlane 
and Kostopulos, that none of such documents would have 
been signed except for such undue influence. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court makes 
the following: 
· CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. At the time the said Wilda Gail Swan signed the 
purported will on May 2, 1947, she was mentally incompe-
tent and lacked testamentary capacity to make and execute 
a valid will, and said will is and should be declared null 
and void. 
2. That when Wilda Gail Swan signed the purported 
will of May 2, 194 7, she was so far dominated by the in-
fluence of Grant Macfarlane that he was able to and did 
substitute his will for hers. The will was, therefore, the 
product of undue influence exercised upon Wilda Gail 
Swan by Grant Macfarlane, and is and should be declared 
null and void. 
3. That at the time Wilda Gail Swan signed the pur-
ported first codicil on February 20, 1950, she was mentally 
incompetent and lacked testamentary capacity to execute a 
valid will or codicil, and the said codicil is and should be 
declared null and void. 
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4. When Wilda Gail Swan signed the purported first 
codicil of February 20, 1950, she was so far dominated by 
the influence of Grant Macfarlane that he was able to and 
did substitute his will for hers. The codicil was therefore 
the product of undue influence exercised by Grant Mac-
farlane at the time he prepared the codicil and at the time 
she signed the same. Said codicil is and should be de-
clared null and void. 
5. At the time Wilda Gail Swan signed the purported 
second codicil she was mentally incompetent and lacked 
testamentary capacity to execute a valid will or codicil, 
and the said codicil is and should be declared null and void. 
6. At the time Wilda Gail Swan signed the purported 
second codicil she was so far dominated by the influence of 
Grant Macfarlane and Daniel Kostopulos that they were able 
to and did substitute their wills for hers. The said second 
codicil was therefore the product of undue influence exer-
cised by Grant Macfarlane and Daniel Kostopulos, and 
should be declared null and void. 
7. The purported will and first codicil under attack 
in these proceedings did not and do not express the will of 
Wilda Gail Swan, but express the will and purpose of Grant 
Macfarlane; and the purported second codicil did not and 
does not express the will of Wilda Gail Swan, but expresses 
the will and purpose of Grant Macfarlane, Daniel Kostopulos 
and Ada and Joseph Lamar Bridge. At the time Wilda 
Gail Swan signed the purported will and each of the codicils 
she was mentally incompetent and lacking testamentary 
capacity to execute a valid will or codicil. The purported 
will and the purported codicils thereto should be declared 
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and adjudged to be null and void and of no force or effect, 
and the estate of which Wilda Gail Swan died seized, both 
real and personal, should be distributed to Theo Swan Hen-
dee, the natural sister and sole hei~ of Wilda Gail Swan, 
deceased. 
8. Theo Swan Hendee, plaintiff and contestant, is 
entitled to a judgment that the purported will of Wilda Gail 
Swan, dated May 2, 1947, and the two purported codicils 
thereto dated February 20, 1950, and April 23, 1951, re-
spectively, are null and void and of no force or effect. She 
is further entitled to a judgment ordering and directing the 
distribution of the entire estate of Wilda Gail Swan to her, 
subject only to the payment of taxes, debts and the costs of 
probate. She is entitled to have judgment for her costs 
herein expended. 
Dated this 14 day of May, 1954. 
PARLEY E. NORSETH 
Judge 
Received a copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclu-
sions of Law, and a copy of the Judgment, this ------------ day 
of May, 1954. 
Attorney for Defendant, 
Grant Macfarlane 
Attorney for Defendant, 
Daniel Kostopulos 
Attorney for Defendant, 
Ada Bridge 
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APPENDIX NO. 4 
OBJECTIONS TO FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate of l 
WILDA GAIL SWAN, 
Deceased. 
THEO SWAN HENDEE OBJECTIONS TO 
Plaintiff, PROPOSED FIND-
-vs.- f INGS OF FACT, 
WALKER BANK AND TRUST CONCLUSIONS OF 
COMPANY, LAW and JUDG-
Executor of the Last Will and Tes- MENT 
tament of Wilda Gail Swan, De-
ceased; Grant Macfarlane; Daniel 
Kostopulos and Ada Bridge, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 34571 
Comes now the defendant, Ada Bridge and makes 
the following objections to the proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment submitted by the plain· 
tiff and received by the defendant's Counsel. 
l. Objections as to Findings of Fact: 
(a) The last sentence in paragraph 16 is con· 
trary to the evidence adduced thereon, and is an attempt 
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to attribute an ulterior and selfish motive in the relations of 
the defendant Ada Bridge with Wilda Gail Swan. 
(b) The first sentence and the third sentence in 
paragraph 28 are contrary to the evidence adduced thereon. 
2. Objections to Conclusions of Law. That the Con-
clusions of Law of paragraphs l and 7 are erroneous and 
particularly that the said Conclusions err in stating that 
the purported will and the purported second codicil ex-
presses the will and purpose of Ada and Joseph Lamar 
Bridge. 
3. Objections to Judgment: The said proposed Judg-
ment is in error in adjudicating that the purported will and 
codicils are null and void and or no force or effect as to 
the interest and claim of the defendant, Ada Bridge; and 
also in error in adjudicating that all of the estate of which 
Wilda Gail Swan died seized and possessed, both real and 
personal be distributed to Theo Swan Hendee as to the real 
property bequeathed to the said Ada Bridge. 
4. That the objections above stated are based upon 
the files and records, including the transcript, in the above 
entitled action and upon the grounds that the findings are 
contrary to the record in this case and that the Conclusions 
and Decree are contrary to law and the fact herein. 
Le Grand P. Backman 
of Backman, Backman and Clark, 
Attorneys for Ada Bridge, 
515 Zion's Savings Bank 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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Mailed a copy of the foregoing to Paul H. Ray and Grant 
C. Aadnesen, Kearns Bldg., Salt Lake City, Utah, attorneys 
for Plaintiff; Calvin W. Rawlings, Brigham E. Roberts 
and Wayne L. Black, Judge Bldg., attorneys for Grant Mac-
farlane; N. J. Cotro Manes, Judge Bldg., attorney for Dan-
nie! Kostopulos and Athol Rawlins, Walker Bank Bldg., 
attorneys for Walker Bank and Trust Company, as exe-
cutor, this 24th day of May, 1954. 
LeGrand P. Backman 
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APPENDIX NO. 5 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
WILDA GAIL SWAN, deceased 
THEO SWAN HENDEE, I NOTICE OF 
-vs.-
Plaintiff, ~ APPEAL 
Civil No. 96977 
Defendant. 
ADA BRIDGE, 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that ADA BRIDGE, 
defendant above named, hereby appeals to the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah, from the trial court's judgment 
in favor of plaintiff and against defendant, dated the 17th 
day of May, 1954; and the trial court's order denying de-
fendant Ada Bridge's motion for new trial, entered in this 
action on the 15th day of July, 1954. 
LeGrand P. Backman 
BACKMAN, BACKMAN & CLARK 
Attorneys for Defendant. 
515 Zion's Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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APPENDIX NO. 6 
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF 
WILDA GAIL SWAN 
I, WILDA GAIL SWAN, of Salt Lake City, Utah, 
being of sound mind and disposing mind and memory, do 
make, publish and declare this to be my Last Will and 
Testament, hereby revoking all former wills by me at any 
time made. 
FIRST: I direct that all my just debts, including 
my funeral expenses, expense of my last illness and ex-
penses of the administration of my estate, be paid by my 
executor hereinafter named out of the first moneys com-
ing into his hands and available therefor. 
SECOND: I devise and bequeath to my beloved sis-
ter, Theo Swan Hendee, the sum of Five Hundred and 
no/ 100 Dollars ( $500.00) and my harp. 
THIRD: I devise and bequeath to my loyal friends, 
Jack F. Forsberg and Frances M. Forsberg, his wife, the 
real property and improvements located thereon at 708-
710-712 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
FOURTH: I devise and bequeath to my friend, 
Grant Macfarlane, the real property and improvements 
located thereon at 326-328-330 South State Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah. 
FIFTH: I devise and bequeath all the rest, residue 
and remainder of my estate of every kind and descrip· 
tion, both real and personal, wherever located now or 
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hereafter owned by me, to my beloved father, Ulysses 
Grant Swan. 
SIXTH: I nominate and appoint Walker Bank and 
Trust Company to be the sole executor of this My Last 
Will and Testament. 
SEVENTH: I nominate and appoint my friend, 
Grant Macfarlane, to act as attorney for the above named 
executor in the administration of my estate. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my 
hand this 2nd day of May, 1947. 
WILDA GAIL SwAN 
Signed by the said testatrix, Wilda Gail Swan, as 
her Last Will and Testament in the presence of us, who, 
at her request and in her presence and in the presence of 
each other, have hereunto subscribed our names as wit-
nesses. 
PATRICIA L. PIKE 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
D. VIVIAN WECCELAND 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
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APPENDIX NO. 7 
CODICIL TO LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF 
WILDA GAIL SWAN 
I, WILDA GAIL SWAN, of Salt Lake City, Utah, do 
hereby make, publish and declare this to be a codicil to 
the Last Will and Testament heretofore · made,- signed, 
sealed, published, declared and executed by me and bear-
ing date of May 2, 1947; that is to say: 
FIRST: Whereas I now desire to make certain 
changes therein and modifications thereof and additions 
thereto; and whereas, the third clause in my said Last 
Will and Testament ·provided: 
"I devise and bequeath to my loyal friends, 
Jack F. Forsberg and Frances M. Forsberg, his 
wife, the real property and improvements located 
thereon at 708-710-712 South State Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah." 
I now revoke said third clause of my said Last Will and 
Testament. 
SECOND: I give and bequeath to my friend, Daniel 
Kostopulos, my set of Havilland china and oil painting 
known as "Girl at the Fountain." 
THIRD: In the event my father predeceases me, 
I give, devise and bequeath the real property and im-
provements located thereon at 708-710-712 South State 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, and the real property and 
improvements, located thereon at 212 South Third East 
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Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, to my beloved sister, Theo 
Swan Hendee. 
FOURTH: In the event my father predeceases me, 
I further give, devise and bequeath the real property 
and improvements located thereon at 1335 Perry Avenue~ 
and 158 South Third East Street, and 234 South Second 
Ea~t Street, and 342 East Second South Street, all in 
Salt Lake City, Utah, to my friend, Grant Macfarlane. 
FIFTH: In the event my father predeceases me, I 
further give, devise and bequeath the real property and 
improvements located thereon at 56-60-60-~ West Third 
South Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, to my friend, Daniel 
Kostopulos. 
SIXTH: I hereby modify, amend and extend my 
aforesaid Last Will and Testament in accordance with the 
provisions of this codicil and as herein modified, amended 
and extended, I do hereby confirm and republish my Last 
Will and Testament. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my 
hand this 20 day of February, 1950. 
WILDA GAIL SwAN 
Signed by the said testatrix, Wilda Gail Swan, as a 
codicil to her Last Will and Testament, bearing date of 
May 2nd, 1947, in the presence of us who at her request 
and in her presence and in the presence of each other 
have hereunto subscribed our names as witnesses. 
PATRICIA L. STEWART 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
IRWIN CLAWSON 
Residing at Salt Lake 
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APPENDIX NO. 8 
SECOND CODICIL TO LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT 
OF WILDA GAIL SWAN 
I, WILDA GAIL SWAN, Salt Lake City, Utah, do 
hereby make, publish and declare this to be a Codicil to 
my Last Will and Testament heretofore made, signed, 
sealed, published, declared and executed by me and bear-
ing date of May 2, 1947, with a Codicil bearing date of 
February 20, 1950. 
WHEREAS I now desire to make certain changes 
and modifications thereof and additions thereto, that is 
to say: 
FIRST: I devise and bequeath to my beloved sister 
Theo Swan Hendee the real property and improvements 
located thereon at 1335 Perry Avenue in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. 
SECOND: I give and bequeath to my beloved Aunt, 
Bell Matsolf of Redlands, California, the sum of One 
Hundred Dollars ($100.00). 
THIRD: I give and bequeath and devise to my 
friend, Ada Bridge, the real property and improvements 
located thereon at 230 and 234 South Second East Street, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
FOURTH: I give and bequeath and devise to my 
friend Dan Kostopulos, the real property and improve-
ments thereon at 212 South Third East Street in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. 
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FIFTH: I give and bequeath the fire insurance poli-
cies covering my real property to the person or persons 
to whom I have devised said real property. 
SIXTH: It is my wish that my dear friend Dan 
Kostopulos make the funeral arrangements for my last 
rites. 
SEVENTH: All of the rest, residue and remainder 
of my property, real, person and mixed not otherwise 
disposed of in my Last Will and Testament and the Codi-
cil thereto, I give, devise and bequeath to my beloved 
sister Theo Swan Hendee. 
EIGHTH: In the event that my sister Theo Swan 
Hendee predeceases me, then I give, devise and bequeath 
the property heretofore devised to Theo Swan Hendee 
and all the rest, residue and remainder of my property 
not heretofore devised, real, personal and mixed, to my 
friends Dan Kostopulos and Grant Macfarlane, share and 
share alike. 
NINTH: I hereby ratify and confirm my said Last 
Will and Testament and Codicil in all other respects. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my 
hand this 23 day of April, 1951. 
WILDA GAIL SwAN 
Signed by the said testator, Wilda Gail Swan, as a 
Codicil to her Last Will and Testament in the presence 
of us, who at her request and in her presence and in the 
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presence of each other, have hereunto subscribed our 
names as witnesses. 
ADOLPH M. NEILSEN, M.D. 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
RoY A. DARKE, M.D. 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
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